

United States Army Sergeants Major Academy Excellence in Writings Class 55

August 2004 - May 2005

The Gen. Ralph E. Haines Competition Papers

NCO History Papers

Ethics Papers

The United States Army Sergeants Major Academy (USASMA) is the Army's executive agent for administering, executing, and overseeing the Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES).

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2004-2005
United States Army Sergeants Major Academy
Fort Bliss, Texas

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Foreword


Professional military Instruction is crucial in developing effective strategies and executing our sensitive missions in today's Army. It fosters individuality in thought and encourages a wide range of perspectives essential to the continued success of the Army.

This publication presents the most outstanding papers of Class 55 of the Sergeants Major Course. Included are the winners and runners-up for the Haines Research Paper, Military History Paper, and Ethics Paper. These papers are the property of the respective authors and of the United States Army Sergeants Major Academy.


Challenges to the status quo are the bedrock of innovative thinking and transformation. The Sergeants Major Course's annual competition with these papers does exactly that - provides an opportunity for the students to think "outside the box" and to present individual and unique assessments of ideas that are espoused by others. The vigorous debates which arise from sharing these ideas in a classroom environment lead to the professional development of each and every student involved in the process.

We want to thank the staff and faculty and every member of Class 55 for their overwhelming success attained throughout the academic year. The papers which follow are indicative of the high caliber noncommissioned officers who pass through the halls of our esteemed institute of higher learning, the pinnacle of the Noncommissioned Officer Education System (NCOES), the United States Army Sergeants Major Academy!

"Ultima!"



James E. Dale
Command Sergeant Major



David J. Abramowitz
Colonel, Aviation
Commandant

Haines Competition Finalist Papers
An introduction
By Dr. Robert Bouilly, Ph.d
USASMA Historian

When Gen. Ralph E. Haines established the Sergeants Major Academy in 1972 he intended it to be the capstone of the Noncommissioned Officer Education System which had been established a year and a half earlier. The curriculum was lengthy for an Army course – nine months. The intent of the course was to provide the education and background necessary for senior NCOs to work well with senior officers. The new sergeant major needed an educational background roughly similar to that provided by the Army War College. Among other subjects the curriculum provided a background in international affairs, military history, current Army problems, and training in writing. These topics were combined in a lesson commonly called the Haines Award Lesson. Gen. Ralph E. Haines lent his name to the competition that became a part of the lesson. He funded the awards for the winning paper and for many years appeared at the Academy for each competition.

The Haines papers are written by groups of five (sometimes four or three) students. They receive or pick their assigned topics near the beginning of the course and finish the papers near the end. Each member of the group has to contribute a portion of the written paper. The group papers are evaluated by the faculty advisor (small group instructor). In committee the faculty advisors choose the four best papers from each of the three major course divisions (Leadership, Resource Management and Military Operations). The 12 best papers then go forward to be evaluated by a committee made up of the leaders from the three course divisions. They in turn choose the best paper from each division. The students who wrote each of the three papers then prepare and present a multimedia presentation of their paper before the entire class. The commandant, the Academy command sergeant major, the Company A commander, and the Academy historian evaluate both the papers and the presentation to determine the winner of the Haines Award.

The winning team is announced at the graduation ball for the class. It is a prestigious achievement. Each member receives an engraved plaque. Their names are also engraved on a plaque that stays at the Academy and contains the names of all the Haines Award winners.

The papers address diverse topics as is evident in the three papers included in this booklet. Some cover historical events; others address issues in international affairs and problems facing the Army today. You are invited to read and enjoy the best Sergeants Major Course Class 55 has to offer in the following pages.

GEN. RALPH E. HAINES PAPERS

War Tribunals on Trial

The Aleutian Islands, 1942 (WW II)

The Normandy Campaign, D-Day

War Tribunals on Trial

SGM Janis A. Doss
SGM Di Marzio Amedeo
SGM James Foreman
MSG Jose F. Diaz
SGM Robert Loneragan

FA: SGM David Schell
M01
16 March 2005

Outline

Thesis: War tribunals and international law do not deter war criminals.

I. War Crimes Tribunals Established

- A. Geneva Convention
- B. International Law

II. Moral Issues in War

- A. Just War Tradition
- B. Responsibility of War Crimes and Obedience of Orders

III. Victor's Justice

- A. Victor's Trial Missing
- B. Asia 1946-1948
- C. United States' Double Standard

IV. Dictators with Major Cultural Differences Don't Fear War Tribunals

- A. Hitler
- B. Pol Pot

V. Counter Argument - War Tribunals Deter Potential War Criminals

- A. Fear of Apprehension
- B. Individual Responsibility
- C. Record of Historical Truth and "Acknowledgement of Victims"
- D. Accomplishment of War Tribunal Trials - 1945 to Present

VI. United States Position on War Tribunals and the ICC

VII. War Tribunals and The Future

The Nuremberg Tribunals created a precedent and held forth a promise: “Never again” would aggression, genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes be tolerated without punishment of the perpetrators. The world has already waited over half a century for that implied promise to be kept. Millions of innocent people have paid dearly for the inability of statesmen to fulfill the dream. Obviously, the Nuremberg Tribunals, one of the most successful war tribunals to date did not deter future war crimes from happening as atrocities throughout the world continue into the 21st Century.

War crimes tribunals are courts of law established to try individuals accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Despite the often heinous nature of the crimes that individuals commit during intractable conflicts, including genocide, torture, and rape, it has become common practice to offer the accused an opportunity to explain his or her actions in front of the victims and their families, as well as the media.

The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols of 1977 are international treaties that contain the most important rules limiting the brutality of war. They protect people who do not take part in the fighting (civilians, medics, and aid workers) and those who can no longer fight (wounded, sick and shipwrecked troops, and prisoners of war). They are definitive, written sources of humanitarian law. They codify the standards that the countries of the world have set for humane conduct in war and represent an assertion that even in wartime there are limits to what is acceptable behavior. They call for measures to prevent serious violations of laws. Nearly every country in the world has adhered to the conventions. They are a monument to global revulsion against the worst atrocities of the 20th Century.

International humanitarian law is a set of rules that seek to limit the effects of armed conflict for humanitarian reasons. It is part of international law, which is the body of rules governing relations between states. International law is contained in agreements between states, in treaties or conventions, and in customary rules. The set of rules protects people who are not or are no longer participating in the hostilities. Its major purpose is to limit and prevent human suffering in times of armed conflict. The rules are to be observed not only by governments and their armed forces, but also by armed opposition groups and by any other parties to a conflict.

The laws were written and the countries around the world agreed upon the rules to prevent war crimes. The Nuremberg Trials set a precedent that war criminals would be brought to trial and punished. We are now in the 21st Century and nations do not seem any closer to stopping war crimes and ethnic violence from occurring. There have always been laws of war. Individual armies have their own laws that determine how their military actions will proceed. Commanders know the “rules of engagement” that are dictated to them. Throughout history, opposing nations have established ground rules of war. The laws defining war crimes and “rules of engagement” pose moral and ethical dilemmas for soldiers as they are faced with their own morality. Morality or not, if a war crime is committed then justice must be done.

Moral issues in war are encompassed within the Just War Tradition (historical moral rules of war) along with the international humanitarian laws. Disrespect for human rights in armed conflicts may be partially or entirely ignored. The claims of morality are difficult to recognize in actual combat although one may say soldiers know their moral and ethical duty. Soldiers are on the battlefield trying to stay alive. They are instilled with the Warrior Ethos and obedience to orders.

The traditional theory of the just war covers three main topics: the cause of war (*jus ad bellum*), the conduct of war (*jus in bello*), and the consequences of war (*jus post bellum*). But most attention is given these days to the conduct of war because crimes are mostly committed during war. That is where offenses are most easily identified though only occasionally reported and even more rarely punished. The two main rules of *jus in bello* have to do with discrimination between combatants and noncombatants, the latter to be spared as far as possible, and with proportionality, so that violence is calibrated to attain the end of war. The claims of morality here are recognized with difficulty in actual combat and disputed when recognized. Why should that be?

It can be readily accepted that soldiers killing other soldiers is part of the nature of warfare. But when soldiers turn their weapons against noncombatants, or pursue their enemy beyond what is reasonable, then they are no longer committing legitimate acts of war but acts of murder. The principle of responsibility re-asserts the burden of abiding by rules in times of peace on those acting in war. The issues that arise from this principle include the morality of obeying orders (for example, when one knows those orders to be immoral), as well as the status of ignorance (not knowing of the effects of one's actions).

War is fueled by emotion that eventually will outrun intent. Once this begins there is a constant ratcheting-up of hatred. Hate produces atrocities, which provoke answering atrocities from the other side and so on in a reciprocal, upward spiral. The basic nature of war drives onward to extremes.

The Just War Tradition and the laws that formulate punishment of war crimes seem inadequate. The evidence indicates that soldiers have frequently refused to regard their opponents as moral equals. Soldiers have recognized the rules of *jus in bello* but regarded the enemy outside their moral boundary.

Sanctions to deter war crimes during conflicts have been ineffective and there are problems with punishment. Stopping short of trying and punishing those responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity does no justice at all. The crimes must be punished adequately or it sends the message that war crimes can be committed because there are light sentences or none at all.

The Allies were unsuccessful in their attempts to bring to trial 896 Germans after World War I who were alleged war criminals. German officials conducted their own trials and ended up prosecuting only 12 of the 896. The two stiffest penalties were given to German submarine officers who sank a British troop ship and ordered their crew to surface in order to machine-gun the helpless survivors. They were sentenced to four years imprisonment but somehow were soon allowed to escape.

The accountability of war crimes was most notorious for the Nuremberg Trials and in the Far East. The Nuremberg and associated trials conducted after World War II were different from most trials because of the Nazi regime. After the initial prosecutions, the enthusiasm for trying war criminals dried up. This account raises the question if this was truly “victor’s justice” for post-World War II trials.

A war crimes commission established by General Douglas MacArthur conducted investigations and compiled detailed evidence on war crimes committed by North Korean and Chinese soldiers. A report issued by the Korea War Crimes Division in June 1953 listed numerous cases that were ready for referral to an international tribunal. Records of atrocities of torture and murder of thousands of prisoners included pictures, statements of witnesses, and signed confessions, but no trials were ever held.

Few U.N. forces soldiers were tried for war crimes, and those who were tried often received light sentences. In *U.S. vs. Kinder*, a soldier was tried and convicted of executing a Korean prisoner despite his claim that he was directly ordered to do so by his commanding officer. He was sentenced to life, but the convening officer reduced his sentence to two years.

The Vietnam War left scars upon the American people over the tragedy of My Lai. There was an attempted cover-up of the illegal, immoral, and unnecessary atrocity. On March 16, 1968, in the village of My Lai, a group of American soldiers, under the command of platoon leader Lt. William Calley, Jr., killed over 500 Vietnamese civilians, including women and children, most of them shot at point-blank range. The Army was slow to prosecute. Most of the enlisted men who committed the war crimes were no longer members of the military and immune from prosecution by court martial. Eventually the Army decided to prosecute 25 officers and enlisted men. However, very few were tried, and only one, Lt. Calley, was convicted. The top officer in charge, General Koster, failed to report known civilian casualties and conducted a clearly inadequate investigation, but the charges against him were dropped and he received only a letter of censure and reduction in rank. The battalion commander, Lt. Col. Henderson was killed in a helicopter crash and never tried. Calley’s commanding officer, Capt. Medina faced charges of murdering over 100 Vietnamese civilians. The charges were based on the prosecution’s theory of command responsibility. If Capt. Medina knew that a massacre was taking place and did nothing to stop it, he should be found guilty of murder. The jury acquitted Capt. Medina of all charges. Lt. Calley was charged with premeditated murder of several hundred civilians and ultimately found guilty of the premeditated murder of 22 of the villagers. The jury sentenced him to life with hard labor. He only served a few days before being placed under house arrest. His sentence was repeatedly reduced and was ultimately pardoned by President Richard Nixon. He was paroled in November 1974. Nixon’s pardon of Lt. Calley was generally approved by the political establishment, but it amounted to a public endorsement of mass murder.

Members of the Iraqi army, while occupying cities in Kuwait, pillaged, raped, tortured, and murdered innocent Kuwaiti citizens. Prior to withdrawing from Kuwait territory, Iraqi soldiers opened oil wells that caused damage to Saudi Arabian water treatment facilities and ignited hundreds of oil wells, which polluted the air, contaminated the soil, and destroyed the oil. There was no initiative by Saddam Hussein or any members of his armed forces to hold the soldiers accountable for these crimes. He certainly knew of them yet did nothing for justice.

There is a lack of accountability in the cases mentioned. War crimes occurred but the perpetrators were not punished or received only a minimal sentence. The responsibility of war crimes must be carried out to all who are responsible. Soldiers must obey orders but they also have the responsibility to morally do the right thing. This leaves an open door for moral issues in war. War tribunals should deter future war crimes from happening. History shows us this attitude of exemption or weak punishment actively encourages even more abuses to be committed. Those who fail to learn from history are doomed to repeat it.

The War Crimes Tribunals were ineffective in transforming a fractured society into one of stability and peace. The Rev. Desmond Tutu argued against a war crimes tribunal, asking for a truth and reconciliation commission. He believed that no reconciliation or transformation would happen if the accused were not forgiven. War crimes tribunals demonized individuals and sometimes whole groups, further separating parties, rather than building peace.

The most powerful argument against the war crimes tribunals is that they punish only the losers. What was most obviously missing following WWII was the trial for the American, French, British, and Russian individuals who committed acts that would be considered war crimes had the Allies lost the war.

The fire bombing of Dresden, Germany, and the use of the atomic weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan, are clear examples of war crimes violations whose leaders would have been tried if the war ended in favor of the Germans and Japanese. Although putting the enemy in prison for what they did may have been satisfying, it was not fair if all those who participated in the war were not held to the same standards.

The United States has also failed to support an international war crimes tribunal, the International Criminal Court, in fear of U.S. officers being found guilty by the court. They also fear this court could be used for political revenge against the world's only superpower.

The American public ignored the war crimes trials in Tokyo and throughout Asia in 1946-1948. Unlike the Nazi leadership, who were disliked all over Europe, the Japanese leadership was not well-known. This was due to Allied propaganda, which did not want to criminalize the Emperor. If the Allied public saw him as a criminal, they would have demanded his removal which might have caused the war to last longer. Emperor Hirohito's role in the conflict is not clear. He is generally seen as ineffectual, although there was evidence offered in the 1990s that showed he was an active participant in the war plan-

ning. However, the Emperor was not indicted because the United States sought to maintain order in Japan. The men put on trial in 1947 and 1948 were the first of 20,000 civilian and military former leaders who either killed prisoners or participated in other war crimes. Many received long prison sentences, and 900 were executed in trials around Asia.

Those executed included Hideki Tojo, General Masaharu Homma, Tomoyuki Yamashita who were blamed for atrocities during the war. The Japanese argued they were subject to war crimes simply because of their association with their German allies.

What was never examined at the War Crimes Trials in Tokyo were the actions of Unit 731 in China. There they used biological, chemical, and thermal tests on Chinese and Allied prisoners. They dropped bubonic plague on Chinese cities, froze naked Soviet prisoners in refrigerators and experimented with anthrax, mustard and phosgene gases on POWs. Very little about Unit 731 was known until the 1970s. The tribunal did investigate the forced sexual slavery of hundreds of thousands of Korean, Chinese, Dutch, and Filipino women. No compensation or even a statement of apology was given; until very recently, nothing was done.

What was never talked about in either the European or Asian war crimes trials were the Allies' war crimes. Systematic atrocities on the scale of Manila or Nanjing were never committed, but the Allies have never apologized for the horrors of firebombing of civilians and the use of atomic weapons. Most of the 20,000 Japanese war criminals were released when the Americans ended their occupation in 1952. Many right wing Japanese deny that any war crimes were committed.

The United States has a double standard. On one hand it refuses to recognize the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal and it also pressures other governments to sign an agreement to bypass the tribunal. Those that sign are treated well. At the same time, the United States holds prisoners in Guantanamo, disregarding requests by the governments of the United Kingdom, Russia, Pakistan, Spain and other countries that their nationals be turned over to them for trial. Diplomatic complaints go through the State Department and Secretary of State Colin Powell passes them on to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, who simply says he will speed up the trials. Powell said the administration was seeking to expedite the processing of suspected terrorists imprisoned at Guantanamo, some of whom have been held for more than a year.

Rumsfeld acknowledged that he received a letter from Powell about the 660 prisoners. Their detention has drawn protests from human rights groups as well as some of the detainees' homelands. The FBI, the Department of Justice, the CIA, and the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency were all involved in the process of interrogating the detainees. The White House has refused to declare the detainees prisoners of war, preferring to leave them in a legal limbo as illegal combatants.

Another criticism of war crimes tribunals is that they do not alleviate the underlying causes of the conflict. In fact, tribunals can escalate conflict,

especially in a multi-ethnic society. In cases of genocide, those accused of war crimes are usually all from one ethnic group. To this group, a war crimes tribunal can appear to be a trial against their ethnicity, not just an individual from their group. This is especially true when the judicial system fails to fairly represent the whole society. For example, Rwandan Hutus accused of killing Tutsis would doubt the possibility of a fair trial if only Tutsis were running the tribunal. Other Hutus, including those not accused, would likely feel the same way. Thus the war crimes tribunal could act as a wedge driving the two groups further apart.

War crimes tribunals offer no deterrent to potential criminals whatsoever. People with strong convictions against a certain religious or ethnic group will likely not feel any less hatred for that group just because a possible tribunal looms in the future. Both Adolph Hitler and Pol Pot believed they would be honored by future generations for the extreme measures they took to change the makeup of their societies. These leaders were inspired by their visions of the future, and it is unlikely the prospect of a war crimes tribunal would have swayed either dictator.

Hitler focused his propaganda against the Versailles Treaty, the “November criminals,” the Marxists and the visible, internal enemy No.1 the “Jew,” who was responsible for all Germany’s domestic problems. In the 25-point program of Hitler’s political party the NSDAP announced on 24 February 1920, the exclusion of the Jews from the Volk community, the myth of Aryan (non-Jewish Germans) race supremacy and extreme nationalism were combined with “socialistic” ideas of profit sharing and nationalization promoted by ideologues like Gottfried Feder. Hitler’s first written statement on political questions dating from this period emphasized that what he called “the anti-Semitism of reason” must lead “to the systematic combating and elimination of Jewish privileges. Its ultimate goal must be the total removal of the Jews.”

Hitler’s intention to rid Germany of the Jews was no secret. He gave speeches about the Jews and how they were responsible for all of Germany’s problems. He was cruel to the Jews and did not care. “Nature is cruel; therefore, we are also entitled to be cruel. When I send the flower of German youth into the steel hail of the next war without feeling the slightest regret over the precious German blood that is being spilled, should I not also have the right to eliminate millions of an inferior race that multiplies like vermin?” Hitler said (Fest, 679-80).

He poured cruelty upon the Jewish people. The genocide of the Jews was the culmination of a decade of Nazi policy, under the rule of Hitler. After the June 1941 German invasion of the Soviet Union, Einsatzgruppen (mobile killing units) began killing operations aimed at entire Jewish communities. The “Final Solution” called for the murder of the Jews of Europe by gassing, shooting, and other means. Up to six million Jews lost their lives—two thirds of the Jews in Europe.

Hitler and his vision were marked throughout Germany. Germany had been the site of an increasing number of measures taken in the name of “racial purity” since the Nazis assumed power in 1933 and included euthanasia. The target was

not only Jews but also certain Aryans who endured forced sterilization of adults, because they had physical or mental handicaps and the murder of infants with similar handicaps. In 1939, the program expanded to include the murdering of numerous sick. Hitler signed an order authorizing involuntary euthanasia in Germany. The order was signed on his personal stationery. The document stated physicians had the power to decide who had incurable illnesses and could authorize a mercy killing. This was another one of Hitler's attempts to rid Germany of any problems whether they were human or not.

The Allies continued to warn Hitler that those responsible for atrocities would be held accountable, but he was never punished for war crimes. He chose suicide. "In order to escape the disgrace of deposition or capitulation" are the exact words as written in Hitler's will dated 29 April 1945 (Friedlander 67).

Pol Pot was another dictator who is known for the vast number of murders committed in Cambodia. Pol Pot's long and horrific reign resulted in an overwhelming number of people killed. This made Cambodia's genocide one of the 20th Century's most horrific events, ranking in enormity with Hitler's Nazism. He took advantage of the destabilization of the region by the war in Vietnam as he led the Cambodian Communist insurgency movement known as the Khmer Rouge. Nearly two million people died in Cambodia between 1975 and 1979. Not a single person has ever been brought to trial for this genocide.

The United States bombed Cambodia relentlessly. Out of the chaos, a small, hardcore band of Maoists, the Khmer Rouge, took control of the country. They emptied the cities, marching people off to rural work camps and turned back the calendar to Year Zero. Pol Pot directed a program to "purify" Cambodian society of capitalism, Western culture, religion, and all foreign influences in favor of an isolated and totally independent agrarian state. No opposition was tolerated. In an effort to create a primitive agrarian utopia, the Khmer Rouge purged the country of everything foreign or modern. Embassies were closed, foreigners were expelled, and currency abolished. They outlawed markets, schools, newspapers, medicine, religious practices, and private property. Members of government, public servants, police, military officers, teachers, ethnic Vietnamese, Christian clergy, Muslim leaders, members of the Cham Muslim minority, members of the middle-class, and the educated were identified and executed.

Towns and cities were emptied and the entire population was forced to relocate to agricultural collectives known as the "killing fields." An estimated 1.5 million were worked or starved to death, died of disease or exposure, or were executed for camp discipline. Reasons for punishment by death included not working hard enough, complaining about living conditions, collecting or stealing food, wearing jewelry, having sexual relations, and grieving over the loss of relatives or friends. Khmer Rouge records from the interrogation and detention center in Phnom Penh (known as S-21) show that 14,449 "antiparty elements," including women and children, were tortured from 1975 to 1978. Seven detainees left the center alive.

Finally Pol Pot and his army were driven from power in 1979 by the Vietnamese. Pol Pot retreated to the countryside and fought a civil war until

1998 when Pol Pot died.

The “people’s tribunal” tried Pol Pot in 1979 in absentia for genocide and sentenced him to death. He never served his sentence. A second time he was tried by the “people’s tribunal” and sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder of Song Sen who he thought to be collaborating with the Cambodian government. He never served this sentence either.

About one-third of the country’s entire population died. In the nearly 30 years since, not a single person has been brought to trial for this genocide. Most of the families of genocide victims live side by side with their former executioners and tormenters. Cambodia must prove they want a tribunal to begin. Cambodia’s Prime Minister Hun Sen was a junior Khmer Rouge military commander prior to defecting to Vietnam in 1977. There are many former Khmer Rouge who carried out the genocide who work in Hun Sen’s government. Evidence points to the fact a Khmer Rouge tribunal proceedings could hurt their image and, more importantly, their domestic political fortunes.

Hitler and Pol Pot were the masterminds behind violent movements. They were the leaders who didn’t care about the humanity. They were never concerned with a war tribunal or paying for their war crimes. They were only concerned with the implementing of their ideologies.

The world has seen a staggering number of genocides against humanity. Similar crimes were perpetrated in Rwanda and Yugoslavia with each resulting in the murder of innocents numbering from several hundred to several hundred thousand. The age of dictatorship is certainly not over.

Counter Argument

There is a tendency during war to blame on the nations or ethnic or political groups involved, rather than blame specific individuals responsible for atrocities of the most barbaric and horrific nature. This breeds racism and does nothing to assist in post-war reconciliation.

It is important to establish is a high personal degree of risk for violating the laws of war. High personal risk is established in three ways. First, by establishing the probability of prosecution for war crimes by the enemy if the war is lost. Second, if the war is won, by establishing the probability of facing criminal court within his or her country. Third, whether the war is won or lost, by establishing the probability international war tribunal may prosecute him or her. This is the strongest possible way to deter criminal behavior during war. The past and present cases of war tribunals provide evidence to the world that the perpetrators of atrocities do not go unpunished and will have to face the consequences of their individual actions, and take responsibility for them, while the world watches. In a free and democratic society, justice must be seen to prevail and criminals must be aware they will be held individually responsible for their actions. It is the moral obligation of the free world to be the watchdog that brings criminals to justice. Failure to act sends the message that such crimes do not matter.

The first war crimes trials in modern times were held after World War II to prosecute German and Japanese war criminals. In 1945 the International Military Tribunal (IMT) charged 22 major war criminals, to include prominent leaders, with crimes and atrocities. There was overwhelming evidence of violence, brutality, and terrorism by the German government. Millions of persons were destroyed in concentration camps. Twelve of those convicted were sentenced to death, three to life imprisonment and four to terms of 10 to 20 years, and three were acquitted. The leaders of the atrocities committed were apprehended and held accountable for their criminal acts. The tribunal assigned guilt to the individual perpetrators and alleviated guilt being assigned to the German people as a whole.

There were another 12 trials held that closely resembled the IMT in Nuremberg, Germany. These were held throughout the four zones of occupied Germany. Nearly 185 individuals were indicted. They included doctors, judges, industrialists, SS officials, and high military and civilian officials who were responsible for criminal acts and policies of the Third Reich. A number of doctors were condemned to death by hanging, and approximately 120 other defendants were given prison sentences. The tribunals acquitted 35 defendants.

The war crimes trial held in Tokyo was another IMT held following WW II. Twenty-eight people were indicted, of which seven were condemned to death by hanging, and all but two of the others were sentenced to life imprisonment. The trial of Japanese General Yashamita Tomoyuki was important because it established the principle of “command responsibility.” It is the duty of a military or civilian commander to prevent military personnel from committing war crimes and war crimes against humanity. He was convicted for failing to stop war crimes committed by his subordinates.

Alleged WW II criminals were brought to trial under national laws long after the end of the war. In 1960 the Nazi official Adolf Eichmann, who was a member of the SS, was captured as a war criminal in Jerusalem where he was tried and executed in 1962. Klaus Barbie, a German Gestapo officer, was convicted in a French court in 1987 for crimes against humanity and sentenced to life imprisonment. Anthony Sawoniuk was convicted and sentenced to life in prison under British War Crimes Act of 1991 of murdering Jews in Nazi-occupied Domachevo. War criminals are still being apprehended and tried for war crimes regardless of time elapsed. This is important to let the people know justice will be done.

The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was established by the United Nations in 1993 to prosecute individuals responsible for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. War began in 1991 when Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence. During the war, between 100,000 and 250,000 people were killed and an estimated 200,000 were wounded. Evidence surfaced that many were the victims of ethnic cleansing, rape, and other atrocities. High ranking members of the Bosnian Serb leadership have been indicted. Radovan Karadzic, former president of the Bosnian Serb Republic, and Serbian General Ratko Mladic, remain at large. The

tribunal was the first international court to find an individual accountable for rape as a war crime. The tribunal convicted three former Bosnian Serb soldiers of raping and torturing Muslim women and girls. The trial established sexual enslavement as a war crime. The tribunal was also the first to indict an active head of state, President Slobodan Milosevic of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. He is specifically charged with conducting a campaign of terror and violence directed at Albanian civilians in Kosovo. In 2001 the tribunal found a former Bosnian Serb general guilty of genocide for his role in the massacre of thousands of Muslim men and boys in 1995. The conviction was the first time the tribunal established that genocide was committed during war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. There have been 82 indictments and 47 cases are still pending. There are 56 currently incarcerated, five are on provisional release; two were discharged and three unconditionally released. There are currently 21 indictees who remain at large. The Yugoslavia trial is still proceeding.

The civil war in Rwanda began between the nation's two chief ethnic groups, the Hutu and Tutsi. The Hutu-dominated Rwandan Army was accused of genocide against the Tutsi. In November 1994 the International Criminal Court for Rwanda (ICTR) was created. The former Rwandan Prime Minister Jean Kambanda pleaded guilty to multiple charges of genocide and crimes against humanity and was sentenced to life imprisonment. There were three individuals found guilty the crime of genocide. These convictions marked the first instances of an international court finding individuals guilty of the crime of genocide. The ICTR currently has 70 people suspected of mass killings in custody, and trials of 25 of them are ongoing while 18 others are awaiting trial. It has handed down 23 judgments and three acquittals.

The United Nations and the Sierra Leone government jointly established a war crimes tribunal, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, to try individuals who had committed atrocities during Sierra Leone's civil war from 1991 to 2000. The civil war began when a rebel group, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), terrorized the country by raping and mutilating thousands of civilians, often by hacking off their limbs. Rebels abducted children and forced them into combat. The Special Court issued indictments in 2003. The court charged seven people, including rebel leader Foday Sankoh and Internal Affairs Minister Sam Hinga Norman, with murder, rape, extermination, sexual slavery, conscription of children into an armed force, and other crimes. Sankoh died in July 2003 while in UN custody. The Sierra Leone tribunal is still proceeding.

A court similar to the Sierra Leone tribunal is scheduled to take place for the atrocities committed by the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. They ruled Cambodia from 1975 to 1979 where more than a million people died of starvation, disease, torture and execution. The Khmer Rouge was overturned over 25 years ago and the people of Cambodia are still waiting for justice to be served.

The families of the victims of ethnic cleansing must feel empowered and have the ability to see the alleged instigator of these horrendous crimes stand up in court and face justice. Records of historical truth and "the acknowledgement of the victims" make it more difficult for history to be altered. Regaining a

feeling of control and empowerment is vital to their dignity that was eroded by the maniacal actions of such criminals.

In countries that have suffered repressive regimes and who hope to become democracies, war crimes tribunals give citizens the opportunity to place their trust and faith in an equitable rule of law. They have the potential to help emerging democracies discover the benefits of a strong legal system while reconciling past atrocities. Rules of democratic law must be accepted and applied even to their most powerful criminals. This process will take an enormous effort of national will. Nations that successfully conduct tribunals within the bounds of such laws prove they can function without reverting to undesirable methods of repression and violence. War tribunals won't end all wars or war crimes. Criminal justice can't even do that domestically. Criminal law isn't abolished because everyone isn't deterred from committing crimes. Deterrence is the main objective of war tribunals and can be measured by their historical accomplishments. The mere existence of certain laws operates to act as a deterrent against wrongdoing. Individuals must decide to violate international laws and take personal risk of prosecution. If war tribunals were not established the atrocities would continue. War tribunals deter some atrocities from occurring and save human lives.

A strong signal has been sent that national leaders will not violate laws of war and the rights of innocent civilians with impunity. Except for the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals, which were held immediately following WWII, and a few national court prosecutions for war crimes undertaken in the interim 50 years, that risk was not present before. The failure of nations to establish a consensus for prosecuting leaders and individuals contributed to the ongoing of slaughters within sovereign states. The establishment of a permanent international criminal court (ICC) helped stop the horrific atrocities in Yugoslavia in 1992. The waiting is over and the ICC has been established without the blessings of some nations including the United States.

The first permanent international court (ICC) to try the most heinous crimes against humanity came into force July 1, 2002. The ICC is able to investigate and prosecute those individuals accused of crimes against humanity, genocide, and crimes of war. The ICC complements existing national judicial systems and will step in only if national courts are unwilling or unable to investigate and prosecute such crimes. The ICC will also help defend the rights of those, such as women and children, who have often had little recourse to justice.

The tribunals are firmly backed by most world leaders and human rights organizations. Many supporters single out what they consider the importance of the Nuremberg Trials in assigning blame for horrific atrocities on individuals instead of on entire societies or ethnic groups. They say the German people would have been burdened with greater guilt and the process of reconciliation and rebuilding of a devastated nation after World War II would have been more difficult.

The international community has a moral responsibility to seek out justice when national governments are unable or unwilling to take action. Many believe

the threat of appearing before a war crimes tribunal can serve as a useful deterrent to those who might commit atrocities with impunity.

Summary

The United States opposes the ICC. There is fear the court could become a base for politically motivated trials of U.S. soldiers deployed abroad. The United States also objects to the way the court's statute gives it jurisdiction over citizens of countries who are not a part of the founding treaty. The United States prefers to support sovereign states seeking justice. If that doesn't work it would then step in and establish special tribunals. There is a perceived lack of representation for developing countries in the Security Council. The U.S. administration believes the U.S. has a greater responsibility, given its power, to intervene around the world to promote stability and security. This makes the United States a target of resentment and hostility. The United States fears it will be treated unfairly by the ICC. The United States has been arranging with as many states as it can to not agree to ICC prosecution of U.S. citizens on their territory. A bill has been introduced in Congress known as the American Servicepersons Protection Act (ASPA) which authorizes the use of "all means necessary and appropriate" to rescue a U.S. serviceperson on trial before the ICC. There are many debates to be resolved before the United States agrees to recognize the ICC. This raises a question as to whether sovereign states are willing to accept the rule of law.

The historical evidence reveals war tribunals do not deter war criminals and atrocities. War itself is hell and soldiers know the rules of law as well as the rules of engagement. If it comes down to "kill" or "be killed" they have to make a decision. The threat of a war tribunal is not on their minds. What is on their minds is their buddy who just got shot and killed in another country that has no respect for human life so why should they. War works on their minds and hate for the enemy works against the morals soldiers are supposed to have. Killing of other humans is justified by the soldiers' support from their societies. Throughout history soldiers have not been considered murderers but have instead been given respect and released at the end of conflicts. Many cases show soldiers were tried for various war crimes but were never convicted, received light punishment, or never served the time mandated. This sends the message that war tribunals don't matter.

War tribunals are accused of "victor's justice" where the defeated are accused of war crimes and others walk free of any responsibility. This is a major criticism of war tribunals. While it is easy and satisfying to put the enemy in prison for what he or she had done, it does not seem entirely fair if all those who participate in a war are not held to the same standards. The bombardment of undefended civilian cities and towns was established as a war crime well before WW II, yet, during that war the increasing escalation of retaliatory action chipped away at the rule. The laws of war were violated by many but few paid the price. The United States, the major superpower of the world, has not ratified the ICC and just adds to the question of who exactly will stand before a war tribunal. It has elected not to participate in the union of the international

community to ensure that international humanitarian law is upheld. It refuses to be held to the same standards as the nations who elected to ratify the ICC. War tribunals cannot allow “victor’s justice” and have standards for all nations when some are exempt from international justice, superpower or not. Either international law applies to all, or it is indeed just “victor’s justice.”

War tribunals don’t deter hatred for religious or ethnic groups. There are leaders who want to shape their culture and purify their nation. The leaders like Hitler and Pol Pot still lurk among the people of the world waiting for the right time to strike. They seek to dominate the world by terror, using genocide and crimes against humanity as major tools to achieve their goals. Tens of millions of civilians have lost their lives in fighting beginning with WW II, most of them on religious, racial, and political grounds. The Nuremberg Trials set the precedent and set forth a promise that aggression, genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes would not be tolerated. Yet, there were only four war crimes tribunals convened between 1945 and the end of the century (Nuremberg, Tokyo, Yugoslavia, and Rwanda). The Nuremberg Trials were a success, but the Cold War forgot about the past and placed it on a shelf for almost 50 years. Suffering and death have been repeated again and again. Ethnic and religious tensions are known throughout the world and have been a part of history for generations. This pattern of violence and criminal behavior will continue until a strong deterrent is in place.

The evolution of international criminal law is a part of a historical process that took its first steps in Nuremberg and walked forward in order to take a step in the right direction with the existence of the ICC. A long journey is in store for war tribunals to be successful in deterrence. Historically, the record does not show much success. The international community can not stand idly by and allow crimes and atrocities to continue or go unpunished. The horrendous atrocities have occurred in almost every corner of the world and the pattern of violence and criminal behavior will continue until a strong deterrent is in place. When will innocent people stop paying for the inability of statesmen to protect their fundamental rights?

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The Aleutian Islands, 1942 (WWII)

SGM Daniel Hagan, Chairperson
MSG La Vonya Watson
SGM Nicholas Rolling
MSG Franklin Jacobs
SGM Allen Haynes

FA: SGM Reginald Daniel
R03
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The Aleutian Islands, 1942 (WWII)

“A military man can scarcely pride himself on having ‘smitten a sleeping enemy,’ it is more a matter of shame, simply for the smitten. I would rather you made your appraisal after seeing what the enemy does, since it is certain that, angered and outraged, he will soon launch a determined counterattack, whether it be a full scale engagement on the sea, air raids on Japan itself, or a strong attack against the main units of our fleet.”

Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, January 9, 1942 (Chandonnet 34)

The above letter by Admiral Yamamoto to one of his friends after the sweeping victory at Pearl Harbor and subsequent successful offensive operations in the South Pacific demonstrated his skepticism over the long term success of the attack. He believed it was only a matter of time before the United States posed a threat to the Japanese mainland or its naval forces in the open sea. Although successful in the first stage of the Japanese Pacific campaign,¹ the second stage checked Japanese offensive operations in the Pacific. The defeat of the Japanese on the Aleutian Islands, and the U.S. naval victory at Midway, prevented them from dominating the northern and central Pacific regions during World War II.

To fully understand the significance of combat in the Aleutians and naval action off Midway Island, it is first necessary to present a chronological account of the historical, strategic, and political considerations that impacted the tactical decisions made during this campaign. Proponent and opponent views will also be introduced to explain the degree of concern held by the Japanese Imperial Empire, the United States, and its allies. These concerns had a profound effect on U.S. and Japanese strategic initiatives and naval battle tactics.

Setting the Stage

By January 1942, the United States was at war with the Germans in Europe, and the Japanese in the Pacific. The United States, with its forces only partially mobilized, and three quarters of its naval fleet destroyed, did not possess the necessary personnel, equipment, and supplies required to conduct offensive operations. A report by the Chiefs of Staff to the War Cabinet committee in August 1942 confessed that their resources were “not sufficient at present to obtain an offensive to be launched against Japan in addition to Germany” (Perras 427).

As a result of these limitations, the United States and Great Britain set out the following priorities (known as the “Europe First” policy) which would govern their strategy in the early stages of the war: (1) The defeat of Hitler², first because they considered Nazi Germany more dangerous than Japan because of its superior economic resources, (2) the preservation of as much of their positions as possible in the Pacific and Europe. (This limited their capabilities to strategic defensive operations/peripheral offensive operations in the Pacific, and offensives on the margin of Europe), and (3) that their fortunes in Europe were

support of the Soviet Union in its fight for survival through the supply of war material over several routes including Alaska (Chandonnet 15).

While the United States and allied forces were fighting on the periphery of Europe, the Japanese launched the second stage of their drive in the Pacific. This second stage was designed with the following strategic objectives: (1) To form a “barrier” to deny the United States the ability to launch air attacks on the Japanese mainland by occupying Attu and Kiska islands in the Aleutians and by the capture of Midway Island³ (2) To create a launch platform for Japanese air attacks against the U.S. mainland, and (3) To lure the crippled U.S. fleet from the Aleutians towards Midway Island as a diversionary tactic aimed at destroying the remaining U.S. carriers and support vessels on the open ocean (Chandonnet 36). This stage was given the operational name “MI/AL Operation”⁴ by the Japanese Naval General Staff and approved by the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters (JIGHQ)⁵ on May 5, 1942.

Admiral Yamamoto’s secondary strategic goals concerning the Aleutian Islands, he meant: (1) To prevent the U.S. from using the islands as airfields, (2) to cut off U.S. and Soviet Union lines of communication, and (3) to advance the patrol perimeter against the American task force (Chandonnet, 37). The following illustration denotes the Japanese limits of advance (May - August 1942) during the early stages of WWII.



The Japanese advance into the Pacific was intended to neutralize any U.S. aerial attacks against the homeland, intercept any naval intervention by the United States, or allow any major U.S. ground offensive operations by means of the Pacific route. Admiral Yamamoto, the Japanese Naval General Staff, and the Japanese Army all agreed that the taking of Midway Island and the domination of the Aleutians would prove the critical axis by which they would maintain strategic control of the north and central Pacific regions.

Politically, the United States faced severe criticism from such countries as Canada and the Soviet Union on their position regarding the Aleutian Island’s military importance to the Japanese. U.S. War Department officials’ original

thought on the Aleutians was that they possessed little strategic value to the Japanese due to the rugged terrain, unpredictable weather patterns, and the lack of available ports of entry and harbors. The War Department focused its efforts providing protection of the U.S. Western seaboard and on halting the continued Japanese offensive efforts in the South Pacific. This was also the sentiment of the U.S. Naval War College, as they doubted the Aleutians could support significant offensive potential given the lack of resources there “except gravel and water” (Perras 67).

This sentiment was disputed by Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan in a 1911 letter, stating that an American fleet based on Kiska Island would compel the Japanese Navy to fall back from Hawaii into home waters, and that a war with Japan was “inevitable.” He advocated an American advance along the Aleutians towards Japan to prepare the way for a bombing offensive that would be “decisive” against congested Japanese cities.

This opinion by Rear Admiral Mahan was based on the submission of a hypothetical strategic plan of war between the U.S. and Japan submitted by Captain Raymond Rodgers, a former student⁶ (Seager and Maguire 382). The hypothetical plan was later transformed into a working strategic roadmap (OPLAN) that played a vital role in the successful defeat of the Japanese during the latter part of WWII.

The Canadians had a genuine concern over the prevention of attacks by the Japanese, they did not want Japan to use Kurile Island⁷ (the northernmost Japanese islands) as a launching base for an attack through the Aleutians as a route to the Alaskan mainland and Canada. This concern was typified by Canadian local commanders in their assessment of the Japanese threat to Alaska. They concluded that Alaska “was the easiest and most attractive objective, if they [the Japanese] ever attacked North America” (Chandonnet 21). The Canadian General Staff also warned the United States that it thought it was reasonable “to expect the Japanese to consolidate and extend their advance toward the continental North America in an attempt to strike a psychological blow against the American home front,” and that, “if not checked, it was conceivable, although admittedly remote, that the enemy could attempt to seize the Queen Charlotte Islands” (Perras 426).

Canadian interest in the Aleutian Islands and defense of the western coast of Canada increased after a Japanese submarine shelled an isolated wireless station and lighthouse at Eastern Point on Vancouver Island. This was the only time during the war that enemy shells fell on Canadian soil. The Canadian Army’s Pacific Command was disappointed that it had little opportunity to fight, and made it clear to Washington that the Canadians would participate in the invasion of Kiska Island if the Japanese occupied it (Garfield 54).

The lines of communication and transportation of supplies and equipment through the Alaskan route was of critical importance to the Soviet Union as it sought to keep the German offensive from reaching Leningrad on the Western Front. Both Stalin and President Roosevelt understood the critical nature of keeping this route open at all costs. A year after the Washington Conference in

1941⁸, the Allied Combined Chiefs of Staff recommended “the Soviet forces must be sustained by the greatest volume of supplies that can be transported to Russia without prohibitive cost in shipping.”

Of course, the form most frequently used to transport supplies to Russia was by freighter, and the most direct route was from Alaska, through the Bering Sea (north of the Aleutians), to the Russia port of Vladivostok in Siberia. Although the Treaty of Portsmouth⁹ left the La Perouse strait open for navigation, and the subsequent Japan-Soviet Neutrality Act further cited “free passage” through the straits, the Japanese continuously objected to the re-flagging of American freighters to Russian control and their use of the Pacific passage. This caused the Japanese to begin interfering with the northern Pacific shipping channels and it wasn’t until 1943 that the Japanese harassment of Russian freighters eased and allowed free and unobstructed passage.

The United States, faced with insurmountable political pressure from its allies, heeded the concerns of its Canadian ally as it decided to prevent the expansion of Japanese occupation of islands in the Pacific. Interception of Japanese intelligence information regarding Midway and the Aleutians¹⁰ in April 1942 decided the courses of events.

The Occupation of Attu and Kiska Islands

*“Hostilities exist. There is no blinking at the fact that our people, our territory, and our interests are in grave danger.”*¹¹

Franklin D. Roosevelt, (United States)

Before Japan entered World War II, the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) had gathered extensive information about the Aleutians, but it possessed no up-to-date information regarding military developments on the islands. Japan assumed that the United States had made a major effort to increase defenses in the area and expected to find several U.S. warships operating in Aleutian waters, including one or two small aircraft carriers, as well as several cruisers and destroyers.


Given these assumptions, Admiral Yamamoto provided the Northern Area Fleet, commanded by Vice Admiral Boshiro Hosogaya, with a force of two



small aircraft carriers, five cruisers, 12 destroyers, six submarines, and four troop transports, along with supporting auxiliary ships. With this force, Admiral Hosogaya was first to launch an air attack against Dutch Harbor, then follow up with an amphibious attack upon the Island of Adak,¹² 480 miles to the west. After destroying the American base on Adak (in fact, there was no base), his troops were to return to their ships and become a reserve for two additional landings: the first on Kiska Island, 240 miles west of Adak, the other on the Aleutian's westernmost island, Attu, 180 miles from Kiska.

Because U.S. intelligence had broken the Japanese naval code, Admiral Nimitz learned of Admiral Yamamoto's plans, including the Aleutian diversion, the strength of Vice Admiral Hosogaya's fleet, and that he would open the fight on June 1, 1943 or shortly thereafter.

Nimitz decided to confront both enemy fleets, retaining his three aircraft carriers for the Midway battle while sending a third of his surface fleet (Task Force Eight) under Rear Adm. Robert A. Theobald to defend Alaska. Theobald



was ordered to hold Dutch Harbor to prevent the Japanese from gaining a foothold in Alaska.

It was Admiral Theobald's belief that once the attack commenced on Dutch Harbor, the Japanese planned a full invasion. This however, was not to be the case. This attack was merely to knock off U.S. defenses around the area of


the main invasion assault force, and since the U.S. had no substantial forces stationed on the islands of Attu and Kiska, the occupation forces landed on the islands unopposed. A year later a combined American-Canadian task force would have to take back the islands. The Japanese attack on the islands did not lure the American fleet into open water and defeat. Instead, American intelligence allowed Admiral Nimitz to position his Fleet for a successful attack on the Japanese Fleet. The Japanese lost four irreplaceable carriers and hundreds of irreplaceable pilots.

The Importance of Midway

"Had we lacked early information of the Japanese movements, and had we been caught with carrier forces dispersed, the battle of Midway would have ended differently."

Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, June 28, 1942 (Morison 158)

The Midway Naval Air Station (NAS) was commissioned on August 18, 1941. Its main strategic purpose was "to provide an early radar warning system



of attempted Japanese sea or air movements or strikes against the Hawaiian Islands, and to provide ship re-fueling operations for U.S. naval operations in the Pacific” (Morison 84).

But the real strategic importance of Midway Island would not be realized until the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), reported to Admiral Chester W. Nimitz that the Japanese planned a diversionary strike against the Aleutian

Islands. The planned strike was an attempt to lure the remaining U.S. fleet out into the open waters of the Pacific, where the Japanese Fleet could destroy it and capture Midway Island. Part of this plan by Admiral Yamamoto, discussed earlier, included Midway as an “outer perimeter” island designed to complete a “barrier” against

American raids on Japan such as those of Colonel Doolittle in April 1942.¹³ The Imperial Japanese Headquarters (IJHQ) had misgivings regarding an operation of this magnitude. It worried that Admiral Nimitz would not re-deploy his forces from the Aleutians.



Despite its misgivings the IJHQ gave the approval for the MI/AL operation. On May 5, 1942, the IJHQ issued the following order: “The Commander in Chief Combined Fleet will, in cooperation with the Army, invade and occupy strategic points in the Western Aleutians and Midway Island” (Morison 75).

Admiral Yamamoto’s forces consisted of five major groups: (1) an advance expeditionary force, (2) a carrier strike force (to engage the U.S. fleet), (3) a midway occupation force, (4) the main fleet (included the Aleutian screening force), and (5) a northern area force that was to occupy the Aleutians (Morison 77).

Naval historians cited numerous reasons for the failed operation at Midway Island and the overall Midway/Aleutian campaign. Admiral Yamamoto did not

expect any opposition by the U.S. fleet during the invasion of Midway; that the Japanese expected to surprise the Americans and that Admiral Yamamoto relied on well-known tactics (Morison 78).

His tactics came from the study of Alfred Thayer Mahan's "The Influence of Sea Power Upon History" written in the early 1900s. Mahan's book, taught at the Japanese Naval Academy at Etajima, focused on a victory based solely on the premise of winning a "single decisive battle by a Navy on the open sea." The use of Rear Admiral Mahan's strategic tactics and "decisive battle" concepts proved invaluable during the Russian-Japanese war of 1904 when the Japanese literally annihilated the Russian Navy, subsequently the Japanese adopted Mahan's strategy as doctrine. Knowing this, as well as Admiral Yamamoto's instruction at Harvard and visits to American naval shipyards, American naval officers and War Department officials predicted Admiral Yamamoto's naval tactics with precision (Kaigun).

Admiral Nimitz, on the other hand, had to argue with the War Department and why he did not intend to deploy his naval forces to the Aleutians and Midway. A certain number of his senior officers believed that the Japanese operation was merely another "hoax" created to screen another raid on Pearl Harbor or even the west coast of the United States (Morison 80). Faced with the first major decision of the Pacific campaign, Admiral Nimitz placed trust in the intelligence received by the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) that the Japanese target was Midway. He placed his entire fleet on offensive alert and deployed additional personnel and equipment to strengthen Midway Island. He deployed his carrier force consisting of the U.S.S. Hornet, Enterprise, and later the U.S.S. Yorktown, 150 miles northeast of Midway Island. Admiral Nimitz issued the following guidance to his commanders: "In carrying out the task assigned, you will be governed by the principle of calculated risk, which you shall interpret to mean avoidance of exposure of your force to attack by superior enemy



forces without good prospect of inflicting, as a result of such exposure, greater damage on the enemy” (Prange 99).

The Recapture of Attu and Kiska Islands

“This monument is dedicated to those who suffered and knew the pain of war. To those who fought and those who died. To the many who defended their country bravely, this monument is in your honor. Aleut Civilians, U.S. Military Personnel, Canadian Military Personnel, Japanese Military Personnel, 1942 - 1945.”

WWII Monument Inscription, Unalaska/Dutch Harbor (Memorial Park 1)

On May 11, 1943 approximately 12,500 American and Canadian soldiers landed on the north and south ends of Attu Island and began pressing towards the Japanese strongholds at Holtz Bay and Chicago Harbor.

Progress was slow and costly. Eight days of heavy fighting passed before the South Landing Force climbed its way out of Massacre Bay. The Alaska Scouts of the Northern Landing Force forced the Japanese from Holtz Bay then continued towards Jarmin Pass and the South Landing Force in a pincer movement. Approximately 2,300 Japanese troops who remained retreated to the wild heights of Fish Hook Ridge above the valley and waited for reinforcements, but none ever arrived. However, on May 23, U.S. P-38 Lightnings met a force of 16 Japanese “Betty” bombers over Attu. Five of the Japanese bombers were downed. It was the last attempt by the Japanese to support their Aleutian troops by air.

On the ground, American forces grew to 15,000. Air strikes and U.S. ground force assaults up the precipitous Fish Hook Ridge further diminished Japanese forces. On May 29, 1943, Colonel Yamasaki and the remainder of his Attu troops, numbering 750 or less, broke through the American lines in a desperate attempt to reach Massacre Bay and needed stockpiles of U.S. supplies. They were finally halted at Engineer Hill, as a hastily organized American defense repelled wave after wave of banzai attacks. Those Japanese troops that were not killed by U.S. fire took their own lives. In the end fewer than 30 soldiers of the North Sea Garrison remained alive. Once Attu Island was secured, the U.S. and Canadian forces focused on Kiska.



Kiska Island is a 4,000-foot volcanic mountain surrounded by a steep succession of hills. It is five miles wide and 22 miles long, constantly engulfed in fog and continuously swept by ice ocean winds. Kiska suffers the worst sea-level weather in the world. It has eight clear days a year, an average of 250 days of rain, powerful winds, and 100

days of bitter cold and dark. The Aleutian weather turned out to be an important factor to the coming military operations.

The Japanese interest in the Aleutians Islands rose after the bombing of Tokyo on April 18, 1942. Unaware that the 16 American B-25 bombers that strafed Tokyo that day had taken off from the carrier U.S.S Hornet at sea, the Japanese intelligence wrongly assumed the flights originated out of a secret base in the Aleutians (Clancey 16).

Lieutenant General Hideichiro Higuda, commander of the Japanese Northern Army, wanted to break up any offensive action the Americans might consider against Japan by way of the Aleutians. He wanted to set up a barrier between the United States and Russia in the event Russia joined with the United States in its war against Japan.¹⁴ He helped to take Kiska and develop it as a barrier.

On June 6, 1943 the Japanese Special Landing Party and 500 Marines went ashore at Kiska. The Japanese captured a small American naval weather detachment consisting of 10 men.

Once captured, Japan landed substantial forces on Kiska. American intelligence determined that the Japanese had begun constructing a runway on Kiska. The Americans worried that increased Japanese submarine forces in the region could interfere with the U.S./Russian supply lines to and from Alaska.

It became clear to the Allied Forces that the Japanese occupation in the Aleutians provided a threat to America's security. It was very important to prevent the development of Kiska as a major enemy base. If the enemy should decide to come toward the mainland from Kiska, U.S. forces would not be able to cut in on their flank.

The invasion of Kiska included 700 Canadians. As allied forces came close to Kiska, the enemy outposts became increasingly more difficult to resupply. The U.S. established a naval blockade around the islands that sank or turned back several enemy supply ships. The Japanese occupation became intolerable. On June 8, 1943, Rear Admiral Akiyama issued orders for the abandonment of Kiska. Also Kiska had lost its importance. For the Japanese, Kiska without Midway no longer had any value as a base for patrolling the ocean between the Aleutian and Hawaiian chains.

The allies took Kiska back without opposition. They did not know it had been abandoned; the allied invasion was conducted under combat conditions until the landing was well underway. The U.S. Army 11th Air Force did heroic work under difficult conditions. They made the first run over Kiska, claiming hits on two Japanese cruisers and one destroyer. Sometime later, unaware of the abandonment of enemy forces, 34,000 allied troops landed on the island only to find the Japanese gone. An inspection of the island revealed that the Japanese defenses had been strong and well placed.

The United States had good reason to believe the Japanese had evacuated Kiska. More than two weeks before the invasion, Japanese ships had daringly slipped through the Navy's blockade and evacuated the last of the island's 5,600-man garrison. In retrospect, all the signs had been there. Japanese radio

on Kiska had gone off the air on July 28, 1943, and American bomber pilots flying over the island since then had not received a single round of antiaircraft fire. Four 11th Air Force P-40 pilots had even landed on Kiska's bombed-out runway to confirm their own suspicions that the island was deserted. Still, Rear Admiral Thomas Kinkaid had ordered the invasion to go on as planned. Even if the enemy had left, he had concluded, the assault would be a "super dress rehearsal, good for training purposes" (CMH 19).

The withdrawal of the Japanese without a fight was unfortunate in one sense. It presented the allies with a false picture of what to expect from the enemy when the odds were hopelessly against them. Instead of fighting to the death, as at Attu, they had faded into the fog without a struggle. Attu, and not Kiska, was to be the pattern of the future (CMH 22). The recapture of Kiska ended the fighting in the Aleutians.

Proponent and Opponent Viewpoints

Proponents of this thesis provide valuable insight into the reasons for the failure of the Japanese to conquer the north and central Pacific region. Most alarming is the Imperial Japanese Navy's own admissions regarding their planning and execution of operations in the Pacific theater during the planned invasion of Midway. Imperial Japanese Navy commanders staged a war game to brainstorm situations and scenarios which might develop before, during, and after the battle. During one such session, the question of what would happen if the U.S. carrier task force had appeared on the flank of the invading force during operations against Midway.

According to Commander Fuchida, the reply was so vague that it implied that there was no such contingency plan. The flanking scenario was dismissed as not likely to occur but that is exactly what happened. Following the games, almost all the participating commanders from Vice Admiral Kondo on down strongly urged Admiral Yamamoto to postpone the invasion until more detailed and thorough battle preparations could be made. Admiral Yamamoto refused the request, citing that there would be inadequate moonlight if they postponed the invasion for a month (Fuchida 95).

Another Japanese analysis of the defeat provides support to proponents. According to Fuchida's analysis of hundreds of documents and eyewitness testimony, the following factors contributed to the failure of the IJN at Midway: (1) Successful United States intelligence, (2) faulty planning on the Japanese part, (3) an unnecessary scattering of Japanese forces, (4) inadequate war-gaming, (5) inadequate search disposition, (6) Admiral Nagumo's decision to attack Midway with two rather than all four carriers, (7) lack of radar equipped ships near the striking force, (8) Admiral Nagumo's lack of situational awareness, and (9) bombs stockpiled on the decks of his carriers at an inopportune time (Fuchida 255).

Vice Admiral William Ward Smith states in his book, "Midway - Turning Point of the Pacific," that the American success was based on: (1) The advanced notice of enemy intent and strength, (2) the Japanese failure to destroy the repair

facility at Pearl Harbor, (3) the loss of Japanese carriers during the Battle of the Coral Sea, and (4) a “god-awful coordinated attack” of the American dive bombers during the Midway battle (158). Admiral Smith also cautioned that being forewarned does not necessarily mean being forearmed. He noted the superhuman repair efforts of the Pearl Harbor dockyard which accomplished transforming a month of repairs into 72 hours on the USS Yorktown. As a result, the Americans had another carrier available for the battle.

The Japanese failed to attack in a timely manner after being notified of the U.S. carrier force’s location. They changed ordnance on their planes and left a great amount of bombs on deck. When U.S. dive bombers arrived they found a virtual “parking lot” of planes and bombs on the Japanese carriers (Smith 159). The ordnance on deck exploded when hit and helped sink the Japanese carriers. Interestingly enough, the outcome of such an attack where planes were left on the decks of carriers had first been predicted in 1933 by Commander Hugh Douglas before an audience at the Naval War College: “In case an enemy carrier is encountered with planes on deck, a successful dive bombing attack by even a small number of planes may greatly influence future [enemy] operations” (Wildenberg 131).

Still another aspect of support for proponents was the utilization of the “box” formation by the Japanese Imperial Navy during the Midway operation. During their war with China, the Japanese Navy felt that it needed to concentrate its carrier forces to provide a large number of aircraft and achieve air superiority. As a result, it used a box formation with the Japanese carriers in the center while the outside shield was made up primarily of battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and support vessels. This concept proved fatal to the Japanese fleet at Midway (Hiryu, Soryu, and Akagi were hit simultaneously in one attack). It would have been much more difficult for American planes to hit three carriers consecutively had they been strategically separated into carrier groups (Wildenberg 132).

It can be argued by opponents that had the U.S. Navy and the War Department adopted Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan’s Orange Plan, the Japanese might have thought twice about launching an attack on Pearl Harbor since naval forces based at Kiska would have provided an early warning to Pearl Harbor of the impending attack. (This is based on the fact that the Japanese used a northern route to move its forces towards Pearl Harbor.)¹⁵

The utilization of the carrier strike force and air power during the Midway/Aleutian campaign is still the subject of much debate, both from a historical and from a strategic point of view. The American carrier task force which fought at Midway (U.S.S. Hornet, Yorktown, and Enterprise), seemed small relative to the carrier force deployed by Admiral Yamamoto (Hiryu, Soryu, Kaga, and Akagi), some believe it was pure luck that the U.S. found and destroyed the four Japanese carriers. But what is not relatively known is that the Japanese had been forced to dry-dock two additional carriers from Carrier Division Five, the Shokaku and the Zuikaku, that had been damaged at the Battle of the Coral Sea, which were slated for use during the Midway campaign.

From an economy of force standpoint, opponents may have a valid argument. Had these carriers been available for use in the Midway operation, the ratio of Japanese carrier to American carrier strength would have been two to one in favor of the Japanese, giving them superiority in both air power and carrier/support vessel depth.

An additional aspect of opponent argument lies in the lack of coordination among the American carriers. This lack of coordination resulted in flights from different carriers arriving at different times over the Japanese fleet and attacking separately.

This caused inefficient utilization of torpedo attacks that preceded the arrival of the two flights of dive-bombers, whose simultaneous appearance was considered “sheer luck” (Wildenberg 131). Had the U.S. Navy coordinated the attack of its torpedo and dive bombers, it would have inflicted even heavier losses on the Japanese and probably would have prevented the loss of the USS Yorktown.

Another consideration regarding the USS Yorktown’s repairs that adds credibility to both proponent’s and opponent’s argument is that, according to Commander Fuchida’s testimony, had the Japanese destroyed the repair yard at Pearl Harbor, the USS Yorktown could not have been repaired in time to be present at Midway. Conversely, Vice Admiral Smith’s testimony attests to the fact that the availability of the USS Yorktown at Midway made it possible for the U.S. Navy to destroy the Japanese carriers at Midway.

The decision by Admiral Yamamoto to divide his fleet also adds validity to both opponent and proponent viewpoints of this thesis. On one hand, his decision to divide his fleet between the Aleutians and Midway gave U.S. naval forces better odds of successfully defeating the Japanese Imperial Navy at Midway.¹⁶ Conversely, if Yamamoto had kept his fleet together, its tremendous firepower would have warded off many attacking U.S. planes and would have drawn some of the attacking planes from the Japanese carriers. Admiral Yamamoto would have also had direct control of the battle. He could have made better use of the battleships (including his flagship, the Yamato) in the battle, rather than keeping them (Fuchida 234).

If Admiral Yamamoto had kept his additional carriers for the Midway battle instead of driving them north, the outcome would have turned out differently, for despite the USS Yorktown’s repairs, there would have been additional search planes, attack waves, and fighter support. In their famous book about the accounts at Midway, Japanese commander’s Mitsuo Fuchida and Masutake Okumiya summed up the battle of Midway: “For Japan, the Battle of Midway was indeed a tragic defeat. The Japanese Combined Fleet, placing its faith in quality rather than quantity, had long trained and prepared to defeat a numerically superior enemy. Yet at Midway, a stronger Japanese force went down to defeat before a weaker enemy” (Fuchida xiii).

Position and Justification

Both the defeat of the Japanese in the Aleutians and the American naval victory at Midway, prevented the Japanese from dominating the north and central Pacific region. The evidence presented here supports this thesis. Had the Japanese succeeded in defeating the U.S. forces at Midway and the Aleutians, they could have (1) captured strategic points in New Caledonia and the Fiji Islands, (2) launched air strikes against Sydney and other points on the southeast coast of Australia, and (3) captured both Johnston Atoll and Hawaii (Fuchida 94).

It can be argued that despite a hypothetical U.S. loss at Midway, U.S. economic and industrial superiority would have created more naval ships, carriers, and support vessels than the Japanese. Of course in the short term, this would have increased the length of the war. Japanese forces might have taken the Hawaiian chain and might have launched air strikes against the U.S. mainland. But eventually the U.S. would have built up enough strength to launch major counteroffensives against both Japanese naval forces and occupational forces in the Pacific.

In assessing the Japanese defeat at Midway, the loss of the Aleutians, one must agree with Commander Okumiya's observation, "As a consequence of my studies, I am firmly convinced that the Pacific War was started by men who did not understand the sea, and fought by men who did not understand the air. Had there been better understanding of the sea and air, Japan would have pondered more carefully the wisdom of going to war" (Fuchida xvi).

Summary

The single most important aspect of the success of the United States during the Midway/Aleutian campaign was the breaking of the Japanese encryption code by the Office of Naval Intelligence through COMINT collection efforts. This provided the U.S. with an early warning of the impending Japanese attack on Midway and the planned diversionary strikes in the Aleutians. Admiral Nimitz's deployment of forces northeast of Midway afforded him the opportunity to develop a "first strike" philosophy, instead of U.S. naval forces being caught in "reactive" warfare tactics.

Many reflect on the battle of Midway as the "turning point of the war" and, from a strategic point of view, it was. This point is emphasized by Captain Tajiro Aoki, Commanding Officer of the Japanese carrier Akagi, sunk in the battle of Midway: "The Battle of Midway was the turning point of the war, for up to that time, Japan had been on the offensive. But after the Battle of Midway, the Japanese were forced to adopt a defensive strategy. It was carrier-based bombers that turned back our fleet there. We lost four carriers to this type of attack" (Fuchida 223).

Undeniably, the Japanese two-pronged attack against the Aleutians and Midway was a bold and innovative strategy which Admiral Yamamoto believed would succeed and give the Japanese a firm foothold in the north and central Pacific. Instead, their drive to conquer the Pacific ended in tragic loss of life and humiliation. The Japanese were forced to adopt a defensive strategy throughout the remainder of the war. The defeat of the

Japanese on the Aleutian Islands, and the U.S. naval victory at Midway, prevented the Japanese domination of the northern and central Pacific regions during World War II.

Notes

1. The first stage consisted of the attacks on Pearl Harbor, the Philippines, Malaysia, the Solomon Islands, and the Netherland East Indies.
2. Note: Four days after the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor, Hitler declared war on the United States.
3. Set as a primary objective based on the “Do little Raid” on April 18, 1942.
4. Midway Island! Aleutian Operation.
5. Japanese Imperial General Headquarters.
6. Became known as the “Orange Plan.” A separate plan was known as the “Red - Orange Plan.” In this plan Great Britain waged war against Japan.
7. Kurile Island became of significant military concern to the U.S. War Department during the latter part of WWII, since they considered it Russian territory despite the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1906 which ceded the Island to Japanese control.
8. Code-named “ARCADIA.”
9. The Treaty of Portsmouth ended the Russian-Japanese War in 1906.
10. The U.S. suspected that “AF” was the code word for “Midway” using the ONI ULTRA decryption device. To test their theory, the ONI sent an uncoded signal that Midway’s water distillation plant was down. They received a Japanese coded message within 48 hours saying that “AF was short of water.” Armed with this and other pieces of COMINT information, ONI officials concluded the target was Midway.
11. The White House, Declaration of War, December 8, 1941.
12. The invasion of Adak Island was cancelled due to the defeat of Admiral Yamamoto’s fleet at Midway.
13. The other “outer perimeter” islands included the islands of Kiska, Wake, Marshall, Gilberts, Guadalcanal, and Port Moresby.
14. Russia was not at war with Japan until the last week of the war.
15. Admiral Mahan’s plan to increase forces and facilities on the Aleutians and Alaska would not be realized due to the 1922 Washington Treaty which placed a 10-year moratorium on new naval base construction, and established maximum tonnages for many classes of naval ships. However, Hawaii, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore, and Australia were exempted from the ban.
16. This assertion includes the decryption of Japanese intelligence regarding the MI/AL operation prior to the Midway battle.

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The Normandy Campaign, D-Day

MSG Christopher W. Pickett

MSG Mark A. Pickett

MSG Sean M. Brewer

MSG David N. Swaine

SGM Janos Gervai

FA: SGM Darius Zagara

L07

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Thesis: The initial success of the Allied campaign in Normandy was the result of a unified command and the ability for the combatant commanders engaged on the ground to freely maneuver their forces.

Outline

I. Introduction: The Allied invasion of Normandy, France, was one of enormous proportion that forever changed the course of history. It involved massive forces put together by the Allied nations, unified under a single common goal and a single command for operations. The relationship of the overall Allied commander, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, with his subordinate combatant commanders was a formula for success. On the opposing side of the Allied forces was a German force equally prepared to defend against the invasion. The Achilles heel for the German defenders was the inability of their commander, Field Marshall Erwin Rommel, to flexibly maneuver his forces. Unlike the Allied force commanders, who were able to adjust the plans issued according to the enemy situation, Rommel and his commanders could not. Rommel was not allowed to counter the Allied strikes as they occurred due to a system of command directives that separated German forces and required permission from Higher Headquarters in Berlin before repositioning. This process took time, allowing the tactical advantage to be on the side of the Allies. This paper will focus on the success of the Allied invasion while the counter argument focuses on Rommel's actions if he had the ability to freely maneuver his forces like his Allied counterparts.

II. Body:

A. The First Strike: Allied airborne troops led the D-Day landings in a combined parachute and glider assault designed to throw a net of protection around the Normandy beaches. This effort supported the massive invasion force that was to land on the beaches at dawn.

B. The British Airborne Units and Mission: The British 6th Airborne Division was to land northeast of Caen and secure the left flank of the invasion force by controlling bridges over the Orne Canal and River.

This would prevent the Germans from bringing in reinforcements. The division consisted of the following: divisional headquarters; 3rd Parachute Brigade consisting of three allied parachute battalions, one parachute squadron, one airlanding anti-tank battery, and a parachute field ambulance company; 5th Parachute Brigade consisting of three allied parachute battalions, one parachute squadron, one airlanding anti-tank battery, and a parachute field ambulance company, and, finally, the 6th Airlanding Brigade consisting of three infantry battalions and one airlanding field ambulance company.

C. The British Airborne Landings and Objectives: The first Allied troops landed in France at 0016 hour with the first glider plowing into a barbed-wired fence. The objectives of this force were the capture of the bridges over the Orne Canal and River and the destruction of the German artillery battery at Merville.

D. 101st Airborne Objectives and their Maneuver Commanders: The objective of the 101st Airborne, led by Major General Maxwell Taylor, was to seize the inland sides of the four causeways leading from Utah Beach; therefore, allowing the 4th Infantry Division to exit the beaches during the dawn invasion. In addition, they were to destroy two highway bridges and a railroad bridge north of Carentan, and seize the lock at La Barquette.

E. 82nd Airborne Objectives and its Maneuver Commander: To the west, the objective of the 82nd Airborne Division, under Major General Matthew Ridgeway and Brigadier General James Gavin, was to destroy two bridges on the Douve River, capture the crossroads town of Sainte-Mere-Eglise, and secure the west bank of the Merderet River.

F. The Omaha Beach Landing: The landing at Omaha Beach began at 0635. The assault was slowed by underwater obstacles which bogged down the landing craft making them easy targets for German gunners.

G. The Utah Beach Landing: The landing at Utah Beach began at 0630. Despite landing south of the target, the assault went according to plan.

H. The Gold Beach Landing: The British XXX Corps consisting of the 50th Infantry Division had the task to invade Gold Beach. The objectives of the 50th Division were to cut the Caen-Bayeux highway, link up with the Americans from Omaha Beach to the west at Port-en-Bessin, and link up with the Canadians from Juno Beach to the east.

I. The Juno Beach Landing: The 7th Brigade of the Canadian 3rd Infantry Division, landed at Juno Beach. The main task of the 7th Brigade on D-Day was to cut the Caen-Bayeux road, occupy the Carpiquet airport in Caen, and make a link between Gold and Sword Beaches.

J. The Sword Beach Landing: The British 3rd Infantry Division, with French and British commandos, attacked Sword Beach. The objective of the 3rd Division was to reach Ouistreham to capture Caen and the

Carpiquet airfield. The attached commandos had the task of fighting their way off the beach and capturing the bridges over the Orne River and Caen Canal. There they were to link up with forces of the 6th Airborne Division.

K. The German reaction to the Allied Assault by resetting the stage: A hypothetical discussion is introduced that allows for Generalfeldmarschall Rommel to have complete control of all German forces in the Normandy Area. A breakdown of units with their missions and locations is discussed.

L. Reacting to the Airborne Assaults: Generalfeldmarschall Rommel reacted to the initial opening engagements of the Normandy Campaign and was able to adjust forces under his control to render the airborne assault useless.

M. Reacting immediately to the different beach threats and driving the Allies back: The discussion addresses how Generalfeldmarschall Rommel employs those forces now under his control. He effectively made the airborne assaults useless and maneuvered his forces to drive the invasion force on the beach back into the English Channel.

III. Conclusion: The Allied invasion of Normandy would as history tells us become an Allied victory. This victory relied exclusively on the fact that the Allied chain of command operated in a decentralized environment. Commanders engaged on the ground were allowed to adjust the maneuver of their forces based on the movement and strength of the enemy. The advantage was purely on the side of the Allies. This paper demonstrates that had the German combatant commander been allowed the same flexibility with which to maneuver forces, the outcome could have been far different. The bottom line is that the Allied system of decentralized control by the commander on the ground produced a tactical advantage during World War II, no matter what theater.

The Normandy Campaign, D-Day

The Allied invasion of Normandy, France, was one of enormous proportion that forever changed the course of history. It involved an array of combat forces put together by the Allied nations that had never occurred before in the history of warfare. All components of the Allied forces were unified with one common goal under a single operational command. The relationship of the overall Allied combatant commander, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, with his subordinate combatant commanders, was a formula for success that allowed for the ultimate success of the campaign. The initial success of the Allied campaign in Normandy was the result of a unified command and the ability of the combatant commanders engaged on the ground to freely maneuver their forces.

On the opposing side was a German force equally prepared to defend against the invasion. The Achilles heel of the German defenders was the inability of the commander on the ground to maneuver his forces in the area without Hitler's approval. The commander was Generalfeldmarshall Erwin Rommel who had the responsibility of defeating the Allies on the beach. However, unlike the Allied force commanders, who were able to adjust the plans issued according to the enemy situation, Rommel and his commanders could not.

Rommel was not allowed to counter the Allied strikes as they occurred due to a system of command directives that separated German forces and required permission from higher headquarters in Berlin before repositioning. This process caused time to be eaten away which allowed the tactical advantage to be on the side of the Allies. This paper points out the successes of the Allied invasion while the German counter argument will be done as if Rommel had the ability to freely maneuver his forces like his Allied counterparts. The German counter argument will demonstrate that if Rommel and his commanders were allowed to maneuver their forces freely, the outcome could have been much different.

Allied airborne troops led the D-Day landings in a combined parachute and glider assault designed to throw a net of protection around the Normandy beaches. This effort was critical to support the massive invasion force that was to land on the beaches at dawn. The first units to strike the German defenses in Normandy belonged to the British 6th Airborne Division, the division consisted of the following: divisional headquarters; 3rd Parachute Brigade consisting of three allied parachute battalions, one parachute squadron, one airlanding anti-tank battery, and a parachute field ambulance company; 5th Parachute Brigade consisting of three allied parachute battalions, one parachute squadron, one airlanding anti-tank battery, and a parachute field ambulance company; and finally the 6th Airlanding Brigade consisting of three infantry battalions and one airlanding field ambulance company.

The mission of the British 6th Airborne Division was twofold. First, the division was to land northeast of Caen and secure the left flank of the invasion force by controlling two strategically vital bridges over the Orne Canal and River in order to prevent the Germans from bringing in reinforcements as the Allies advanced eastwards. The second objective was the destruction of the Merville artillery battery, which was several miles to the northeast of these

bridges. The battery was an imposing fortification that contained four large caliber guns that could do terrific damage to the invasion fleet. The 6th Airborne Division had to attack and destroy these guns in the hours before the landings (Mark Hickman, 6th Airborne Division–Normandy).

On 5 June 1944 at 2230 hours in southern England thousands of Allied troops readied themselves for what was to be the greatest battle of all time. At dawn on 6 June 1944, two Allied armies, one British and one American, landed on the beaches of Normandy in France. It was the largest invasion ever attempted, and its ultimate goal was to secure a foothold in Europe, to defeat Germany and liberate the continent from Nazi rule. Leading the invasion, landing by parachute and glider, several hours before the first troops assaulted the beaches, were three Airborne Divisions; two were American and landed in the west, the other, the 6th British Airborne Division, landed in the extreme east (Hickman).

The 6th Airborne Division's objectives were the capture of the two bridges over the Orne Canal and River. One later became known as the Pegasus Bridge. These objectives had to be secured to enable the Allied troops to move from the beachhead and to prevent the Germans from bringing in reinforcements, especially the 21st Panzer Division, to squash the landing at Sword Beach.

At 0001 hours, the Allied gliders were over France; the invasion had begun. The first glider of Allied troops from the 6th Airborne land in France at 0016 hours plowing into a barbed wired fence at about 100 mph. It landed in a field within 47 yards of objective Pegasus Bridge as planned. MAJ John Howard with his elite troops were onboard. They quickly exited the glider to avoid becoming sitting ducks next to a guarded bridge. Intelligence indicated that the bridge was rigged with explosives and there were over 600 tanks close by, so they had to move quickly to secure the bridge before the Germans blew it up. They stormed towards Pegasus Bridge with MAJ Howard leading the charge, LT Brotheridge led the charge across the bridge with loud battle cries in order to shock the enemy. He fired the first shot on D-Day killing a sentry. Seconds later, he was killed by German machine-gun fire, being the first to die by German gunfire on D-Day. The charge was successful; the German guards fled, and the Allies secured defensive position around the bridge. The objective was secured at 0021 hours. They then had to hold the bridge until reinforcements arrived.

At 0130, the German counterattack began with two panzers coming towards Pegasus bridge, the Allies did not have anti-tank weapons, but they had a primitive grenade launcher that was successful in blowing up the first tank. The other tank turned tail and ran. The bridge was still secure. The 21st Panzer division was only 30 minutes away in Caen but could do nothing because it had to get Hitler's authorization on what to do. At this time, Hitler was sleeping and no one had the courage to wake him, and even if he was awake, he did not have the situational awareness necessary to know what to do. Only the on-ground commander had that insight. If Rommel, the commander in charge of the Normandy defenses, had been in Normandy he could have made some decision. However he was elsewhere celebrating his wife's 50th birthday. In the

book, *D-Day: The Lost Evidence*, by Chris Going and Alun Jones, they point out, that the 21st Panzer Division was instructed not to move without orders from Army Group B. This caused the commanders to hesitate because of fear to make a decision.

The 9th Parachute Battalion's task was to destroy the German gun battery at Merville. At about 0100 hours on D-Day when the paratroopers began jumping, their equipment was torn from them because the planes were flying too fast. Some even landed without weapons. Bad weather and pilot errors left them scattered over the countryside not knowing where to find their objective. Of all airborne units, the 9th Parachute Battalion suffered worst from the airdrop. Their task was to destroy the Merville Battery, but after hours of waiting at the rendezvous, no more than 150 of its men arrived and very little of their special assault equipment was available. Their commander, LTC Terence Otway, had no choice but to attack with what he had.

The battery was formidable. One hundred thirty Germans, supported by numerous machine-gun positions, defended it, all sitting inside two huge belts of barbed wire, in between which was a minefield. Silently, the paratroopers cut their way through the wire and cleared paths in the minefield. As they were forming up for the attack, they were spotted and fired on by no fewer than six machineguns. As these were being dealt with, Otway gave the order to attack, whereupon the assault party charged across the minefield, lobbing grenades and firing from the hip at any sign of enemy resistance. The Germans fought back hard and punished the assault party severely. However, they could not prevent the British from reaching the casemates, and once inside they engaged the defenders hand-to-hand. At a heavy cost, the guns were destroyed and in so doing the lives of hundreds, possibly thousands, of men in the invasion fleet were saved. (Hickman)

While the British were assaulting their assigned objectives, United States paratroopers from the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions were assaulting their assigned objectives in Operation Neptune. This would be the first time in history that airborne units from two different countries combined under a joint command against an enemy force. Little did the combatant commanders realize that they were creating a new doctrine that would revolutionize military tactics for years to come.

Operation Neptune was the largest use of airborne troops up to that time. Paratrooper elements of the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions comprising six regiments, numbering more than 13,000 men, were flown from bases in southern England to the Cotentin Peninsula in 925 C-47s. An additional 4,000 men consisting of glider infantry with supporting weapons, medical, and signal units were to arrive in 500 gliders on D-Day and on D-Day-plus-one to reinforce the paratroopers. Additional troops from seaborne echelons were to join the divisions on D-plus-one as well. The paratroopers had the most difficult task of all, a night jump behind enemy lines five hours before the coastal landings.

The objective of the 101st Airborne, led by Maj. Gen. Maxwell Taylor, was to seize the inland sides of the four causeways leading from Utah Beach, thus,

allowing the 4th Infantry Division to land and exit the beaches during the dawn invasion. In addition, they were to destroy two highway bridges and a railroad bridge north of Carentan and seize the lock at La Barquette. At 2215 on D-minus-one, over 430 C-47s began taking off from England with 6,600 paratroopers from the 101st scheduled to drop at H-minus hours. Preceding the main echelons of paratroopers by half an hour were 20 Pathfinder aircraft, which had the mission of marking six drop zones for both divisions and one landing zone. The Pathfinder team's zone markings were not entirely successful, however their efforts contributed to the overall mission success.

The 101st paratroopers approached the Cotentin from the west and made their landfall near the town of Les Pieux. Aircraft formations were tight until reaching the coastline where they were met by dense cloudbanks that loosened the formations and caused a scattered parachute drop. In general, the 101st did not have a good drop, although it was better than that of the 82nd. This poor drop resulted in 1,500 paratroopers KIA (killed in action) or captured, as well as the loss of 60 percent of their equipment in swamps or in fields covered by enemy fire. Only a fraction of the division's organized strength could initially be employed to undertake the planned missions, and at best, the mixed groups of paratroopers did not correspond with their original assignments. The 51 Waco gliders carrying command personnel and antitank weapons came in early on D-Day morning. This type of landing had never been attempted before in darkness, which resulted in many glider wrecks as they landed in the small Normandy fields. At the end of the day, however, the loss of personnel was not too excessive and the equipment suffered relatively little damage.

The confused German command was uncertain whether the landings represented a major action or an Allied attempt to tie off the Cotentin Peninsula at its narrowest point. This uncertainty and unplanned deception played directly into the maneuver commander's hands. The uncertainty of the German command was duplicated in its subordinate and lower units. This uncertainty, coupled with the lack of German command leadership, made them reluctant to move out of prepared defenses to attack the 101st paratroopers. The Germans did not take advantage of the window of opportunity to launch a counter attack on the scattered invading American forces. Thus, the enemy's confusion and hesitation aided the airborne maneuver commanders in accomplishing most of their initial missions. They cleared the enemy's secondary beach defenses and established a defensive position for VII Corps' southern flank.

To the west, the 101st Airborne and 82nd Airborne Divisions, under the command of Major General Matthew Ridgeway and Brigadier General James Gavin, gained possession of the east bank of the Merderet River near St.-Mere-Eglise. The occupation of these positions actually fell far short of the mission assigned to the divisions. The 82nd was to assist in sealing off the peninsula from the south by destroying bridges at Pont-l'Abbe and Beuzeville-la Bastille and to secure bridgeheads across the Merderet. Protection of the southwest flank of the VII Corps was to be accomplished by securing the line of the Douve River. Additionally, they were charged with proceeding west toward St. Sauveur-le Vicomte.

The drop of the 82nd did not go as planned; the regiment's assigned to the zones west of the Merderet had the worst drop in the entire operation. The 507th PIR (Parachute Infantry Regiment) landing was widely scattered on the drop zones north of Amfreville. The 508th PIR landing southwest of Amfreville and north of Picaudville had a slightly better drop. In contrast with these two PIRs, the 505th PIR landings northwest of St. Mere-Eglise, between the railroad and the main highway, had one of the best drops of any airborne unit involved. Nearly 1,000 of the 2,200 men landed on target, and most of the others, although scattered to the northeast, were able to assemble rapidly. As fortune would have it, these paratroopers landed in an area that had minimal German Army occupation. The rapid assembly of the 505th PIR enabled them to quickly capture the St.-Mere-Eglise objective, that later became a focal point for the Allies' offensive.

The capture of St.-Mere-Eglise and the fights for the Merderet River crossings at la Fiere and Chef-du-Pont constituted the principal efforts of the 82nd on D-Day. Furthermore, there were a number of isolated groups of paratroopers that organized themselves west of the Merderet, and fought independently for several days. These isolated groups of paratroopers contributed to the overall accomplishment of the division's missions, even though their efforts were not part of the planned objectives.

The airborne phase of the campaign was now complete and the most critical phase of the Normandy Campaign, the beach landings, began. Like the airborne assaults, General Eisenhower and his planning staff assigned the beach assaults to different nationalities. He gave command of the beaches code named Omaha and Utah and the assault of gun emplacements at Pointe-Du-Hoc to the United States forces under the command of General Omar Bradley. Gold, Juno, and Sword beaches were given the British forces under the command of British Field Marshall Miles Dempsey. The overall commander of the beach assault forces was British Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery.

The American landing on the beaches of Normandy occurred on a scale never seen before in military history. The American assault took place on a two-beach front, code named Omaha and Utah, and at Pointe-Du-Hoc. The success of the entire European invasion rested on the successful beach landings. The Allied mission was to land, penetrate the Atlantic Wall, and secure a lodgment in an area suitable for operations. Once a beachhead had been established, and room to deploy inland was secured, the Allies could begin the process of bringing ashore the weapons needed to seal the Germans' fate. To establish this beachhead, the Allies could count on their air superiority to hamper German movement of reinforcements.

In order to keep the German Panzer divisions northeast of the Seine River the Allies launched an elaborate deception plan named "Fortitude." This elaborate but little known deception probably saved thousands of Soldiers' lives. When the Allies started planning the second front in 1943, they knew that landing on the far side of the channel and securing a beachhead would be the most difficult part. While they planned to land in Normandy, they decided to try

to deceive the Germans into thinking the main attack would come at Pas-de-Calais.

The Germans, expecting an invasion, had erected strong fortifications along the coast. Beaches were lethal jungles of mines and barbed wire; guns faced out to sea and reinforcements waited inland. Starting in 1943, a skilled Allied team worked to create the illusion of a large invasion force massing in Kent, England, across the channel from Pas-de-Calais. The deception included dummy tanks and aircraft, made of inflatable rubber and placed in realistic looking camps and filling the harbors with fleets of mock landing craft. To German reconnaissance aircraft, it all looked real, even down to attempts at camouflage. Knowing that German intelligence would be trying to find out more, double agents planted stories and documents with known German spies. General George Patton was supposedly commander of the non-existent force. Broadcasting fake radio transmissions made the Germans think the Allies' were busy organizing a large invasion force. The hoax was successful beyond the Allies wildest hopes. The Germans concentrated their forces in the Pas-de-Calais.

The deception continued during and after D-Day. While the real invasion force landed in Normandy, Allied planes dropped silver foil to give the impression on radar of massed planes and ships crossing from Dover. The Germans thought the Normandy landings were a diversion and kept back reserves of tanks and troops in the Calais area to counter what they thought would be the real invasion. By the time the German leadership realized the deception, it was too late to use the reserves effectively to counter the invasion.

The initial American assault from landing ships and craft was on a three-division front, including two Ranger battalions, between the Orne River and the Cotentin Peninsula. The U.S. V Corps consisting of the 29th and 1st Infantry Divisions had the responsibility of securing Omaha Beach and the U.S. VII Corps consisting of the 4th Infantry Division had the responsibility for securing Utah Beach. The U.S. 2nd Ranger Battalion had the responsibility of capturing a gun battery at Point-Du-Hoc.

The main objective of the American ground forces' training was to get ashore. All the training focused on the D-Day assault and nothing further. This single focus later became a hindrance when the units advanced ashore and had to take on the rigors of hedgerow fighting. The training they received included loading and unloading of landing craft, countless hours on rifle and machine gun ranges, live overhead fire, demolitions, poison gas drills, and first aid. This type of training was common among the other divisions in the assault force. The Ranger battalions' training also included 25-mile speed marches, mountain climbing, cliff scaling, hand-to-hand combat, and special training with rocket-propelled grappling hooks.

The landing at Omaha Beach began at 0635. The men landing at Omaha Beach encountered the fiercest resistance anywhere on D-Day. When the first wave landed, they found that the naval gunfire and air bombardment had done little to soften the German defenses. Underwater obstacles slowed the assault, bogged down the landing craft and made them easy targets for German gunners.

The Allied intelligence had indicated a lightly defended beach. They somehow had overlooked the highly trained German 352nd Infantry Division defending the beach.

The bluffs overwatching the beach gave the defenders excellent fields of fire and observation. On the approach to the beach, many of the landing craft never made it to shore. The ones that made it ashore, dodging artillery and mines, often discharged the troops in water over their heads. The casualty rates at the beach were extremely high, some units suffered over 90 percent killed or wounded. The engineers with the task of reducing the obstacles at the beach had problems clearing lanes. The German gunners zeroed in on them once they realized the engineers' mission. As the morning wore on, the incoming tide covered the marked lanes and the second wave could not find them. At one point in the operation, commanders considered abandoning the assault and diverting troops to the other landing sites. Slowly, however, the soldiers established a foothold and began to advance across the fire-swept beach. By the end of D-Day, V Corps had established a beachhead on the Normandy coast.

Several minutes before the assault on Omaha Beach, VII Corps started its assault on Utah Beach. Unlike the V Corps assault, the landing went rather smoothly. By luck, the moving tide pushed the assault boats about 2,000 yards south of the intended landing site. This site was much more lightly defended than the planned landing site. The commanders on the beach quickly exploited this mishap and redirected the additional waves to a new, less defended landing site. At the end of the day, the VII Corps had not achieved their entire objective but had a firm foothold on the shore of Normandy.

Pointe-Du-Hoc was located northwest of Omaha Beach. The point was a rocky outcropping with nearly vertical cliffs that ended in the channel. The U.S. 2nd Ranger Battalion had the mission to scale the 100-foot high cliffs and neutralize a battery of 155mm guns on the point. The operation faltered shortly after it began. A, B and C Companies of the Rangers depended on A Company of the 116th Regiment to secure the beach for their landing. This plan failed after the Germans wiped out A Company on the beach. C Company landed shortly after the ill-fated A Company and immediately started taking fire. Only 31 men from C Company made it to the base of the cliffs. Unable to move off the small beach, the Rangers had no choice except to go up. Several Rangers made it to the top of the cliff, threw down ropes, and assisted the remaining Rangers up the cliff. Once on top, the Rangers discovered telephone poles sticking out of the pillboxes and no gun battery present. D Company made it to shore intact, scaled the cliff and cleared German positions much the same as C Company. Around 0830, a patrol discovered the relocated artillery battery about 250 yards inland and put it out of commission. Throughout the rest of the day, the Rangers cleared a farmhouse, numerous trench lines, and other German fortifications. At the end of the day only 50 of the 200 Rangers who made it to the top were capable of fighting. Even so, the Rangers completed their mission and prevented the artillery from pouring deadly fire on Omaha Beach and our ships at sea.

The landing of the Allied British, Canadian and French forces on the Gold,

Juno and Sword beaches on the D-Day was also part of the invasion. Soldiers from numerous units and from different countries had to work together with full coordination. The success of these multiple operations demonstrates the great work accomplished by the Allied forces during the preparation and execution of the invasion.

The British Second Army under Lieutenant General Miles Dempsey had the task to invade the Gold, Juno, and Sword beaches. The elements of the Second Army were the follows: The British XXX Corps, consisting of the 50th Infantry Division, had the task of invading Gold Beach. The 50th Infantry Division, consisting of the 69th, the 151st, and the 231st Brigades and the 61st Reconnaissance Regiment, which included the 50th Division's engineers and signals elements. The 74th, 90th, and 124th Field, 102nd Anti-Tank and 25th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiments also belonged to the 50th Division. The Canadian 3rd Infantry Division landed on the Juno Beach. It included the 7th, 8th, and 9th Brigades, the 1st Special Service Brigade and divisional troops such as 7th Reconnaissance Regiment, 3rd Canadian Division's engineers and signals troops, the 12th, 13th, 14th Field, 3rd Anti-Tank and 4th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiments. The British 3rd Infantry Division, made up of the 8th, 9th, and 185th Brigades, divisional troops and attached French commandos, attacked Sword Beach.

The success of the invasion depended on the units' advance on the beaches. Before the first units reached the three designated landing zones, Allied naval forces bombarded the significant German defensive installations with more or less success. Gold Beach was more than five miles wide and it had three subdivided sectors such as Item, Jig and King. H-Hour at Gold Beach, set for 0725 hours - one hour later than the scheduled landings on the American beaches, allowed for a longer Allied naval bombardment of the objective. The objectives of the 50th Division were to cut the Caen-Bayeux highway, link up with the Americans from Omaha Beach to the west at Port-en-Bessin, and also to link up with the Canadians from Juno Beach on the east. Units of the German 716th Division and elements of the veteran 1st Battalion of the 352nd Division defended this area of the coast.

Because of the shallow beaches, the British troops had to leave the grounded landing crafts early so the soldiers had to wade a long way to ashore. The first wave suffered under heavy fire from the German defense units. The 1st Battalion lost their commanders within a few minutes. The 1st Battalion's heavy casualties, however, was not typical for the whole Gold Beach. Fortunately, for the British units, the shore bombardment was mostly effective and destroyed the German armored resistance. The Germans held out at La Riviere until approximately 1000. Still the British managed to occupy La Hamel by mid-afternoon. By the evening of June 6, the 50th Division had landed 25,000 men on Gold Beach and had penetrated six miles inland.

Juno Beach with its six-mile width also had three sectors named Love, Mike and Nan. This beach had very heavy German defenses. The main task of the Canadian 3rd Infantry Division on D-Day was to cut the Caen-Bayeux road, invade the Carpiquet airport in Caen, and make a link between Gold and Sword

Beaches. The first assault wave landed at Juno Beach at 0755 hours, 10 minutes past H-Hour and fully three hours after the optimum low tide. This delay was because of the Canadians had a difficult situation. During the first wave, half of the tanks sunk before they could fire a single shot. Numerous soldiers also died when the landing crafts doors opened to a hail of German machine gun fire. Contrasted with Gold Beach, the shore bombardment had not been effective on Juno Beach. The German defense units had practically no casualties. The 7th and 8th Brigades took tremendous losses, and because of this the men thought the invasion was unsuccessful. Adding to their difficulties during the fight, the tide came in and narrowed the beach. Slowly Germans moved back before the Canadian assault. At the end of the day, 21,400 soldiers landed on Juno Beach and the 3rd Division had linked up with the British 50th Division from Gold Beach to the west. But to the east, the Canadians were unable to make contact with the British 3rd Division from Sword Beach.

Sword Beach was five miles wide from Lion-sur-Mer to Ouistreham. The sectors of the beach were designated Oboe, Peter, Queen, and Roger. The objective of the British 3rd Infantry Division was to reach Ouistreham, to capture Caen and the Carpiquet airfield. The attached commandos had the task of fighting their way off the beach and penetrate toward the bridges over the Orne River and Caen Canal. There, they were to link up with forces of the 6th Airborne Division. The Allies reached the Sword Beach at 0725 hours on D-Day. The landing units met with moderate fire and, by 0800 hours, the fighting was mostly inland. At the end of the day, the British had landed 29,000 men on Sword Beach and had taken about 700 casualties. The commandos had linked up with the airborne forces at the bridges. However, the British units had not reached Caen.

Counter Argument

If the German combatant commander had been allowed to freely maneuver his forces at the start of the Normandy Campaign, rather than having to seek permission from Berlin, the outcome of the invasion would have resulted in an Allied defeat. In order to understand why this statement is correct, one needs to look at Adolph Hitler's past decisions. The year was 1943 in World War II and the reality of Adolph Hitler's plan of conquering Europe was not going as expected. Although the German armies had been successful in the West, the situation on the eastern front was troubling.

Hitler had lost all confidence in the abilities of his German Army General Staff and issued a proclamation that once placed, units would not move without his explicit permission. Hitler also broke up all unity of command, assigning separate commanders duties within the same sector of operation. An example of this can be found in Normandy, were Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel was in charge of coastal defenses but Field Marshal Gerd von Runstadt was commander of German forces in the West. This order would cost Hitler dearly, setting the stage for a major Allied victory 18 months later in the Normandy Campaign.

This complex chain of command would affect how the Germans reacted to an Allied assault in France. Both generals involved in the defense of the Atlantic Wall had different thoughts about how to best repulse an Allied landing in Western France. Generalfeldmarschall Rommel was of the firm belief that the only way to defeat an invasion was to counterattack the beach landings as early as possible with armor and wanted at least some armor placed close enough to the beaches to deliver an immediate counterattack. Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt favored concentrating the Panzer divisions farther inland so that the primary enemy line of advance could be determined, and then a counter-attack in force could be launched to blunt it. Rundstedt prevailed and the armor units were held back from the coast. These two far different thoughts of maneuver, combined with the inability of Generalfeldmarschall Rommel to properly control the units with the mission of defeating an Allied landing in Normandy, are examples of major factors that allowed for an Allied success.

The remainder of this paper is presented as a counter argument to the Allied invasion by means of a hypothetical situation. This hypothetical argument gives Generalfeldmarschall Rommel complete control of the German forces in the West. They would have the mission of defeating the Allied forces at the start of the Normandy Campaign. It also assumes that Hitler's order of 1943 had not been issued and that Generalfeldmarschall Rommel had the ability to freely maneuver the German forces. The paper does not add any additional units to the area of operations nor does it add any additional obstacles. It merely demonstrates to the reader that Hitler made a major tactical error in his order in 1943. Had this not occurred, the Allied assault on the Western Fortress, as it was called by the Allied command, would have had a far different outcome.

The first of many factors taken into consideration prior to the initial battles of the campaign are the defenses and German units controlled by Generalfeldmarschall Rommel. The defenses established by Rommel were elaborate and designed to stop the invasion on the beach and also to contain an inevitable paratroop assault. To stop the beach invasion forces, Rommel oversaw the fortification of already heavily defended ports, by the laying of additional anti-personnel mines in a 100-meter-wide belt along the edge of the water. Rommel also established a network of trenches, firing pits, and resistance nests dug into the bluffs overlooking the beaches, which were supported by pillboxes and concrete bunkers covering the principal beach exits. Finally, Rommel flooded the valleys of the Orne, Merderet, and Douve Rivers. These rivers were located on the flanks of the prospective Allied lodgment area and were flooded to impede the mobility of any assaulting forces. To defend against a paratroop assault within the German rear area, Rommel had all prospective glider landing areas and personnel drop zones either flooded or placed large stakes in the ground to keep or destroy the glider landings.

The next factor was the troop strength Rommel had available to him for coastal defense operations. Each unit had a specific mission in his elaborate but common sense plan to push the Allies back in the channel within 48 hours. The 716th German Infantry Division, which was comprised of the 441st, 726th and

736th Infantry Regiments, protected the coastal area of the Omaha, Gold, Sword, and Juno landing zones. The 352nd German Infantry Division, comprised of the 914th, 915th, and 916th Infantry Regiments, defended the Omaha landing zone, and the city of St. Lo. The 709th German Infantry Division, comprised of the 729th, 739th and 919th Infantry Regiments, protected the eastern and northern coast of the Cotentin Peninsula, including the Utah Beach landing zone. Finally, the 243rd German Infantry Division, comprised of the 920th, 921st, and 922nd Infantry Regiments, protected the western coast of the Cotentin Peninsula. Although personnel estimates are sketchy concerning the actual strength of each one of these units, historians believe the strength to have been roughly 100,000. It must be noted that Rommel's coastal defense units were made up of two different types of soldiers. Neither type were first-line soldiers. One type was Germans who, usually for medical reasons, were not considered fit for active duty on the Eastern Front. The other type of soldier found in the unit came from various other nationalities such as Soviet prisoners of war from the southern USSR who had agreed to fight for the Germans rather than endure the harsh conditions of German POW camps. In the book, *The German Army D-Day: Fighting the Invasion*, David Isbey argues the real ace in the hole for Rommel in his defense of the Atlantic Wall would have lain in his reserve strength providing he had freedom to freely maneuver these forces. The 21st German Panzer Division, a veteran panzer unit, comprised of the 22nd Panzer Regiment, 200th Assault Guns Battalion and the 125th and 192nd Panzer Grenadier Regiments, were located in the Caen region. The 6th German Fallschirmjäger Regiment, an elite parachute regiment belonging to the 2nd German Fallschirmjäger Division, along with the 30th German Fast Infantry Brigade, comprised of three bicycle battalions, were located near the town of Carentan. Finally, there was the 12th SS Panzer Division which had recruited its soldiers directly from the Hitler Youth movement at the age of 16. It was stationed to the southeast of Caen. The reserve strength estimate of forces available to Rommel was in the neighborhood of 150,000 soldiers. The unique characteristic about these reserve forces was the fact that all the units, except one, were made up of hard-core combat veteran soldiers who had just rotated from the eastern front. The one unit that had not seen action yet was the 12th SS Panzer Division, but the ferocity and brainwashing of the Hitler Youth program made up for the lack of experience.

On the night of June 5, 1944, Rommel would have to wait no more. The opening salvo of the attack began when the British 6th Airborne Division went into action, at 10 minutes past midnight with the objective of capturing Pegasus Bridge and others on the rivers at the east flank of the Sword Beach landing area and also a gun battery at Merville. Rommel, knowing that this was the opening assault, realizes immediately that these bridges were critical to his defense of the beach area. Should they fall into enemy hands, or worse be destroyed, it would cut off elements of the German Fifteenth Army to the west needed in mop-up operations of the Allied invasion. To counter this assault, Rommel moves the 12th SS Panzer Division south from its position around Caen to engage and destroy the British 6th Airborne Division. After completing that task, the division

had follow-on orders to move to tactical assembly areas where it could reinforce the defensive line along Juno and Sword Beaches.

The next airborne assault requiring Rommel's immediate attention and adjustment of forces would be the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions' parachute assaults. History has told us that these two divisions completely missed their objectives due to unexpected weather conditions and the effectiveness of Rommel's defensive measures in glider landing and drop zones. The Allied divisions were effective, despite missing their initial objectives, in disrupting and confusing the Germans. This disruption made an effective counterattack by the Germans impossible along the eastern side of the area of operations. Rommel, though, under this hypothetical situation, takes the weather conditions into account. Finding out that the United States paratroop divisions were rendered incapable through intelligence gathered from captured paratroopers, he goes into action.

Rommel orders the 6th German Fallschirmjäger Regiment supported by the 30th German Fast Infantry Brigade, both located in the vicinity of Carentan, to establish blocking positions in the sector. He orders the 21st German Panzer Division to move at full speed east to tactical assembly areas located north of Carentan directly opposite both Omaha and Utah Beaches. This division receives strict orders to bypass any type of engagement with Allied paratroopers operating in the area. Their main objective is to be in place at their respective assembly areas where they could counter anticipated beach assaults. Rommel now has the airborne assault under control; he knows that the Allied paratroopers cannot succeed without receiving reinforcements from the beach landings. Peter Tsouras points out in his book, *Disaster at D-Day, The Germans Defeat the Allies, June 1944*, that by engaging these scattered forces with quick, limited forces, Rommel can concentrate on defeating the Allies at the beach.

The assault of the Allied beach landings begins practically simultaneously throughout the Normandy coastline. Rommel allows for the Allied units to gain but a small foothold on the five beachfronts. Having moved his reserves into tactical assembly areas behind the beach line, he wanted to allow the Allied commanders to believe their paratroop assaults had been successful. Finally, after the first six hours of the beach assault, Rommel decided to execute his counterattack in order to crush the Allied invasion. He immediately orders the 12th SS Panzer Division, which was fresh from defeating the British 6th Airborne Division, to support the 716th German Infantry attack along Gold and Juno Beaches. Meanwhile, elements of the German Fifteenth Army roll across the bridges to the west, which the British 6th Airborne Division was to have taken. The 15th Army assaults Sword Beach, in support of the 716th German Infantry there. In the east, Rommel splits the 21st German Panzer Division between Omaha and Utah Beaches in support of the counterattack launched by both the 352nd German Infantry attack and 709th German Infantry Divisions respectively. Rommel also requests and is immediately granted use of the 17th SS Panzer Division located to the far West around Poitiers, France. He orders it to move east and hit Utah Beach for mop-up operations. This request for forces

was made because the 17th SS Panzer Division was located in a blocking position that anticipated southern France beach landings. Within 24 hours of the invasion, Rommel now has the initiative against an Allied invasion force numbering in excess of 360,000 troops. After 48 hours, in accordance with his well-devised plan, Rommel pushes the Allies back into the channel and is able to maintain Fortress Europe at his Atlantic Wall.

Summary

The Allied invasion of Normandy was an Allied victory. This victory relied exclusively on the fact that the Allied chain of command operated in a decentralized environment. Commanders engaged on the ground were allowed to adjust and maneuver their forces based on the movement and strength of the enemy. The advantage was purely on the side of the Allies. As this paper demonstrates, had the German combatant commander, Generalfeldmarschall Rommel, been allowed the same flexibility with which to maneuver his forces, the outcome could have been far different. The ultimate success of the operation was that the Allied system of decentralizing control to the commander on the ground resulted in a German defeat.

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NCO HISTORY RESEARCH PAPERS

Highly Decorated NCOs

Noncommissioned Officers Candidate Course

Hathcock II - Marine Sniper

Contributions of the Unsung NCO

SGT Peter Francisco

African American Hero Receives Medal of Honor

Highly decorated Noncommissioned Officers in the United States Armed Forces and German Armed Forces during the Second World War

SGM Manfred S. Jerabek
German Army

FA: SGM Phillip Parham
R11
28 February 2005

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Comparison of the highly decorated NCOs in the United States Armed Forces and the German Armed Forces

A. Introduction of the important role of medals and awards for soldiers and to the important role of highly decorated Noncommissioned Officers in the Second World War in two different armies.

In years of war, each country honors their heroes in their own way. In the old days, heroes received titles such as “Count,” “Earl,” or “Baron” or they received property as an appreciation for their action in combat. However, it was also appropriate to honor them with promotions to a higher rank or with medals. Giving their heroes medals is the cheapest way for a country to honor them, because the medals and an appropriate certificate are less expensive than bestowing titles or giving them some real-estate or a higher rank. Soldiers are not hard to satisfy; a medal or a certificate of appreciation for their work is the normal and common way to meet their desire. In the following pages, I will analyze the numbers of Medal of Honor recipients in the United States Armed Forces and the numbers of Knight’s Cross recipients in the German Armed Forces during the Second World War. Both awards were the highest military recognition each country offered to honor their soldiers’ actions on the battlefield.

Of the 18 million German Soldiers who participated in the Second World War, only 7,320 received the Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross. That is only 0.04 percent of the German Armed Forces. Of the 16 million American Soldiers who participated in the Second World War, only 440 received the Medal of Honor. That is only 0.002 percent of the United States Armed Forces.

Pointing to these numbers and percentages, we can speak about “elites” within the armed services of each country. My focus in analyzing those numbers is on the Noncommissioned Officers in each army. Field manuals of each army emphasize their important role within the forces; “NCOs are the backbone in the Army.” We will see at the end how true this statement is.

I will also try in the last part of this paper to compare and contrast both armies and I will try to find out if bravery is comparable and if numbers are comparable.

I will try in this paper to find answers to the questions of:

1. Were the NCOs the backbones of their armies and did their armies recognize this by awarding them an equitable portion of awards in combat?
2. Is bravery comparable from one army to another army?
3. Do tough and bloody war theaters or battles result in an increase in awarding medals on both sides of the battle?

This paper will also reflect the important and significant roles of highly decorated NCOs in the armies during the Second World War.

More than 90 percent of all statistics, tables, and numbers in this paper are new. This means previously there were only lists of names, but no statistics. During my research, I found out that these numbers have never before been published. No one has conducted research on the NCO Corps of both armies in relation to the highest military award. Therefore, the overviews and numbers analyzed here are new. I counted everything myself and put all the tables and

statistics in place, as you will see on the following pages. I asked the “Medal of Honor Society” and the “Knight’s Cross Association” if previous research had been done. Both organizations said no.

Each overview consists of three parts. I follow an old military principle, the triad of (A) – address (B) – appraise (C) – conclude.

The special role of NCOs in the United States Armed Forces and German Armed Forces who got a “Field Commission” and were promoted from an NCO rank to an Officer rank is not a part of this paper. An unknown number of NCOs in both armies received commissions because of their heroic actions on the battlefield. For example, Audie Murphy was the most decorated and well known American hero in the Second World War. He started his career as an NCO and received countless awards and a field commission to 2nd lieutenant. Audie Murphy received the Medal of Honor in the rank of an 2nd lieutenant. Therefore, he is not recognized in this booklet. Michael Wittmann, on the German side, was the most successful tank commander in the whole Second World War. Wittmann and his tank crew destroyed more than 150 enemy tanks on the Russian Front and in Normandy. He started as an NCO in the Waffen SS where he received countless awards and decorations as an NCO and also received a field commission to 2nd lieutenant. He received the Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross as a 2nd lieutenant in January 1944 on the Eastern Front, the Oak Leaves to the Knight’s Cross as a 2nd lieutenant in January 1944 on the Eastern Front and the Swords to the Knight’s Cross as a 1st lieutenant in June 1944 in the Normandy. He too is not recognized in this booklet.



SGT John D. Hawk (left) received the Medal of Honor on August 20, 1944 in Falaise, France.

SGT Hinrick Ahrens (right) received the Knight’s Cross on January 1, 1945 on the Eastern Front.



B. United States Armed Forces: Medal of Honor Recipients from 1941-45.


1. Bestowal regulations for the Medal of Honor.

The Medal of Honor was established in July 1862 by joint resolution of Congress.

“Awarded in the name of Congress to a person who, while a member of the Armed Services, distinguished himself conspicuously by gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life beyond the call of duty while engaged in an action against any enemy of the United States.”

The Medal of Honor has been given to 3,459 soldiers since 1862 but it was awarded only 440 times during the Second World War. That means, from the 16 million American Soldiers who participated in the Second World War, only 440 received the Medal of Honor. This represents only 0.002 percent of the United States Armed Forces. Since its creation in 1862, the Medal of Honor has been a symbol of courage and bravery on the battlefield, recognized by other Soldiers, civilians, and politicians and by the former enemies as well. For example the German Knight's Cross Association honors and respects its counterparts in the United States of America as heroes and the elite on the battlefields of the last World War. These soldiers stood and fought against each other in the trenches of the Western Front or on the beaches of Normandy and Italy. Today the veterans of the Second World War respect each other for fulfilling their duty to their country.

2. Total overview by branch: Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, and posthumous.




(A) As you can see in this figure, the total number of conferments in the U.S. Armed Forces during the Second World War was 440 during 45 months of combat. In comparison, during the Civil War from 1861 through 1865 (51 months), 520 Medals of Honor were given to Union Soldiers. The U.S. Air Force is not recognized in this overview, because this branch was established later in 1947. The Air Corps was a part of the U.S. Army at that time.

(B) The Army was and still is the main fighting force during a conflict, therefore, the numbers of casualties and heroes in this branch are the highest in the armed forces. With 68.4 percent, and 301 Medals of Honor, the Army leads the other services. Two hundred and fifty soldiers did not survive on the battlefield and received the Medal of Honor posthumously.

(C) Must a hero be dead, to be recognized? That fifty-six point eight percent of the soldiers never received the Medal of Honor during their lifetime, could indicate that "a true hero has to be dead." However, this is not the real

meaning behind the bestowal regulations! Is it not?

3. Total overview by rank groups of Officers, Sergeants, and Junior Enlisted Soldiers.




(A) In this figure we can analyze the number of conferments on Officers, Sergeants and the Junior Enlisted Men (from E1 through E3) during the Second World War.

(B) Notice the almost equal percentage of Medal of Honor recipients in the three rank groups, as you take a closer look at the 33.3 percent line.

(C) The almost equal percentage of Medal of Honor recipients in the three rank groups could be seen as an unwritten rule to keep the numbers of recipients on the same level in the ranks. A comparison with other conflicts like the Korean War or Vietnam War could be very interesting. Maybe there was a political or military reason to keep the numbers between the rank groups at the same level.

4.NCO Medal of Honor recipients by branch and posthumous.




(A) This figure shows the NCO Medal of Honor recipients broken down by branch and posthumous awards. The Coast Guard had no recipients in the rank of a sergeant; therefore, this branch is not recognized in this paper. To get a better impression and idea about the “War in the Air,” I took the liberty and presented the U.S. Air Corps as a separate branch.

(B) As mentioned before the Army carried the main load of the battle and the number in this table it recognizes that load. The high number of posthumous conferments is, again, an indicator of the brutal fight in the trenches and on the beaches of Europe and Asia. With a 41.6 percent posthumous award rate for the NCOs is 15 percent lower than the percentage of all service members combined. The low number of medals for NCOs in the Navy and Air Corps are because officers were in charge of ships and airplanes.

(C) Comparing the numbers of casualties to the Medal of Honor recipients within the different branches, the impression may appear that the Navy and the Marine Corps had different criteria for awarding the Medal of Honor. Only one NCO from the Navy received his award during his lifetime and only one third of the Marines. Again, the impression appears the Medal of Honor was an award for “dead heroes.”

5. NCO Medal of Honor Recipients by ranks from E4 to E8 and posthumous.




(A) The figure shows the number of Soldiers in the ranks from corporal through master sergeant who received the Medal of Honor in the Second World War. The rank of sergeant major was not established at this time in the Armed Forces.

(B) The structure and the numbers in this particular overview are almost identical with the rank structure in the forces; therefore, the numbers of Medal of Honor recipients are the same percentage. The numbers of posthumous conferments are lower than the total average with two exceptions.

(C) Sergeant and staff sergeants are in the center of battle within the rank

group of sergeant. Their efforts on the squad level and their abilities to take charge on a higher level of responsibility, such as a platoon or company, are mirrored in these numbers. The fact, that all sergeants first class and 66 percent of the master sergeants did not survive their action on the battlefield, is very interesting but not readily explained.

6. NCO Medal of Honor recipients by year from 1941 through 1945 and posthumous.




(A) The figure shows the five years of war or 45 months of war. As we know, the war started in December 1941 with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and ended in August 1945 in Japan.

(B) The structure and the numbers in this overview are almost identical with the timeline and with the battle and war intensity in the Pacific and in the European war theaters. The number of Medal of Honor recipients increased and decreased with the battle action.

(C) After the invasion of Italy in 1943 and of Normandy (France) in 1944, the war in Europe intensified until the unconditional surrender of Germany in May 1945. The percentages of posthumous conferments are lower than 50 percent, with one exception. The attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 took the lives of all NCO recipients. All three of them are from the Navy. At Pearl Harbor the Navy began its practice of honoring heroes “killed in action.”

7. NCO Medal of Honor recipients by war theaters, Europe and Pacific, and posthumous.




(A) This figure gives you an overview of the number of Medal of Honor recipients divided into the two main war theaters, Europe and Asia in the years 1941 through 1945. It also shows the awards given posthumously.

(B) As we can see, the numbers indicate Europe as the most aggressive battlefield theater. The war, of course, started for the U.S. Armed Forces in the Pacific and ended in the Pacific, as well. The numbers of recipients in the Pacific are lower, but the percentage of killed recipients is higher than 60 percent. This indicates higher battle intensity.

(C) The war in the Pacific ended with the unconditional surrender of Japan in August 1945 after the dropping of two atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

8. NCO Medal of Honor recipients in the European war theater, divided into North Africa, Italy, France, Germany, and posthumous.





(A) This figure provides an overview of different parts of the theater including North Africa, Italy, France, and Germany. It shows the numbers of posthumous conferments.

(B) The numbers again reflect the battle and war intensity. Therefore, the numbers of Medal of Honor recipients increased and decreased with the battle action and the numbers of months in the actual theater. The number of posthumous conferments were lower than the total conferments in each theater except North Africa.

(C) After the invasion in Italy in 1943 and in Normandy in 1944, the war in Europe intensified until the unconditional surrender of Germany in May 1945.

C. German Armed Forces:
Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross recipients in the timeframe 1939-1945.

1. Bestowal regulations for the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross and the higher graduates.

Established on September 1, 1939:

"The Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross can be awarded to soldiers of each rank for exceptional acts of gallantry which decisively affect combat actions. The conditions for this are: Individual decision to act on own initiative, outstanding personal bravery and decisive success in the context of the overall conduct of the action."

The Knight's Cross was given to 7,320 Soldiers from 1939 until 1945. During the air battle against Great Britain in 1940 and 1941 German fighter pilots enjoyed incredible success. To recognize their successes the German leadership decided to add additional steps to the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross. Therefore, the next higher level of this award was created and was called



the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves. It was presented to 883 German Soldiers. The next higher level was called the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves and Swords, given only 159 times to German Soldiers and the next level created was called the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves and Swords and Diamonds. This award was given only 27 times to German Soldiers. The highest level, given only one time to a German fighter pilot, COL Hans Ulrich Rudel, was called the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross with Golden Oak Leaves and Swords and Diamonds. Each higher level would mean, awarding the Knight's Cross for a second, third, forth or fifth time to the same soldiers.






7320 Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross, established on September 1, 1939.

883 Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves, established on June 3, 1940.

159 Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves and Swords, established on July 15, 1941.

27 Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves and Swords and Diamonds, established on July 15, 1941.

1 Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross with Golden Oak Leaves and Swords and Diamonds, established on December 29, 1944.

<u>The Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross</u> <u>and his higher steps</u>				
	Total	Officer	Sergeant	Jun. Enlisted
 Knight's Cross	7320	5615	1450	255
 Oak Leaves	883	846	37	0
 Swords	152	151	1	0
 Diamonds	27	27	0	0
 Golden Oak Leaves	1	1	0	0

The total number of conferments was higher than appears in this table and in the history books. The reason for this is that Germany lost the war and many awards were unofficial in the last weeks of the war in Europe. First, we need to understand two different terms. The first is called “conferment – *de facto*” the second is called “conferment – *de jure*.”


A conferment – *de jure* is a conferment following all regulations and meeting all commitments regarding awarding procedures. A conferment – *de jure* is an officially recognized and acknowledged conferment.

A conferment – *de facto* is a conferment were a Soldier received an award (Knight's Cross) in public with witnesses and so on, but the awarding proce-

dures are not official and the awarding officer had no official permission to present the award.

Let me describe the situation with one of many examples from the end of the Second World War. Army Private 1st Class Josef Allenberger was the second best German sniper during the Second World War, with more than 250 confirmed “kills” on the Eastern Front in the time period from 1943 until 1945. Private Allenberger received the Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross from Field Marshal Ferdinand Schoerner on April 20, 1945. There were enough witnesses for this ceremony and Allenberger received a temporary award certificate as well. However, Josef Allenberger was never recognized in the official books about the Knight’s Cross recipients. He received the Knight’s Cross “*de facto*” from a field marshal, but “*de jure*.” The field marshal was not authorized to present this kind of award or to sign a temporary award certificate. There are still a lot of discussions going on about this matter, but those kinds of “stories” happened at the end of the war.

2. Total overview, by branches, Army, Navy, Air Force, Waffen SS, and posthumous and KIA




(A) As you can see on this figure, the total number of *de jure* conferments in the German Armed Forces during the Second World War was 7,320 over 69 months of war. Two thousand two hundred ninety-nine Soldiers did not survive their heroic actions on the battlefield and received the Knight’s Cross posthumously or died subsequently in combat or in prisoner of war camps after the war. There is not a more detailed accounting because of inaccurate records.

(B) With 65.4 percent, and 4,779 Knight’s Crosses, the Army carried the brunt of the battle. The Army was the main combatant, therefore the numbers of casualties and heroes in this branch were the highest in the Armed Forces. Today the Army is still carrying the main load in battle; this rule will continue in future wars as well.

(C) The Waffen SS as the youngest branch within the Armed Forces was only an “Army”-related organization made up of infantry, armor, and mechanized units. With 40 volunteer divisions, this branch entered battle as “Elite

Units.” Their number of casualties and therefore their number of Knight’s Cross recipients were very high as well. During the Second World War, about 18 million German Soldiers served in the Armed Forces. The 7,320 Knight’s Cross recipients were only 0.04 percent of the total Armed Forces.

3.Total overview by the three rank groups of Officers, Sergeants, and Junior Enlisted Soldiers.




(A) In this figure we can compare the numbers of conferments for officers, sergeants and the junior enlisted men (from E1 through E3) during the the Second World War.

(B) Almost four more officers received the award than sergeants. A very low number of Knight’s Cross recipients were junior enlisted soldiers. They received less than 4 percent of the awards, an insignificant number compared to the 76.7 percent awarded officers.

(C) This overview indicates the Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross was designed for officers and was only given in exceptional cases to lower ranks. The second conclusion could be, in an exact reading of the bestowal regulations, that all the officers had shown very outstanding personal bravery. How is it possible for a staff officer in the rank of colonel or for a general to do so?

Therefore, I think it is necessary to have a closer look at the officer percentage, to understand the high number of conferments in this rank group. I added a few other overviews to this subgroup to highlight these numbers.



The bestowal regulations are clear; they did not change during the war. However, military and political leaders in the German Armed Forces, with Adolf Hitler on the top, needed to make modifications. The modifications were necessary to keep the generals and the general staff officers in a good mood and highly motivated. The Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross and especially the higher steps were also awarded for "tactical decisions" on the battlefield. This resulted in a high percentage of conferments in the general and general staff officer rank group.

The Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves and Swords and Diamonds	
Total conferments	27
Generals	13
Colonels	4
Lieutenant Colonels	1
Majors	4
Captains	2
Lieutenants	3
Other ranks	0

Out of a total of 27 Knight's Crosses with Diamonds, 13 were given to generals and four to colonels. Field Marshal Erwin Rommel and the fighter ace Adolf Galland were two of those.


Out of a total of 159 Knight's Crosses with Swords, 75 were given to generals and 17 to colonels. The famous tank ace Michael Wittmann was one of the three lieutenants

who received the swords, but unfortunately, he was killed in action one month later. Sergeant First Class and fighter ace Leopold Steinbatz was the only NCO who received the swords to the Knight's Cross. His award was also posthumous.

The Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross
with Oak Leaves and Swords

Total conferments	<u>159</u>
Generals	75
Colonels	17
Lieutenant Colonels	19
Majors	24
Captains	17
Lieutenants	6
Other ranks	1 (SFC Steinbatz)

4. NCO Knight's Cross recipient overview, by branch, Army, Air Force, Navy, Waffen SS, and posthumous.




(A) This figure shows the NCO Knight's Cross recipients divided into branches and posthumous. As mentioned many times before, the Army carried the main load of the battle and the number of Army recipients in this table recognizes that fact.

(B) The high number of posthumous conferments is, again, an indicator of the brutal fight in Europe. The Army awarded 11 percent of its Knight's Crosses (99 of 963) posthumously. The Air Force awarded 14 percent of its Knight's Crosses (56 of 399) posthumously. A very high number of recipients died later on in the war or in captivity.

(C) The low number of Knight's Crosses awarded to NCOs by the Navy were because officers were almost always in charge of ships or submarines. On the other hand, sergeants in the German Air Force were fighter pilots. They were

fully responsible for an airplane and its crew, and they were very successful. SFC Leopold Steinbatz is an example. He was the only NCO who received the Knight's Cross with Oak Leaves and Swords. The award honored his 99th air victory on the Russian Front.

5. NCO Knight's Cross recipient overview, by ranks from E4 to E9, and posthumous.




(A) The figure shows the number of Soldiers in the ranks from corporal through sergeant major who received the Knight's Cross during the Second World War and the posthumous numbers.

(B) The structure and the numbers in this particular overview are almost identical with the rank structure in the Forces, therefore the numbers of Knight's Cross recipients are in the same percentage. Within the Army, the platoon leader position was given to the rank of sergeant first class and his deputy's rank was a staff sergeant. The same constellation took place in the Waffen SS. It was common and normal in the Air Force to have sergeants as fighter pilots. Therefore, a very high percentage of Knight's Cross Recipients from the Air Force are in the rank of sergeant first class or below. The percentage of posthumous conferments is in the 10 to 12 percent range in all ranks.

(C) Staff sergeants and sergeants first class were in the midst of battle within the rank group of sergeants. Their efforts on the platoon level and their abilities to take charge on a higher level of responsibility, such as a company, were mirrored in these numbers. The posthumous award of the Knight's Cross is in the normal range of casualties during the war.

6. NCO Knight's Cross recipients overview, by war year from 1939 through 1945 and posthumous.




(A) This figure shows the seven-year period of war - 69 months of war. As we know, the war started in September 1939 with the German attack on Poland and ended in May 1945 in Berlin. Therefore, the numbers in 1939 and 1945 reflect only the actually months of war.

(B) The structure and the numbers in this overview are almost identical with the timeline and with the battle intensity in the different war theaters in Europe. The number of Knight's Cross recipients are increased and decreased with the battle action. The numbers of posthumous conferments were lower than the total average with one exception.

(C) After the great losses in Stalingrad in February 1943 and the surrender of the German Africa Corps in May 1943 in Tunisia, the war changed dramatically. The Eastern Front began to collapse; the Southern Front broke after Italy surrendered to the Allied Forces in 1943; and the Western Front was unable to hold, after the landing of the Allied Forces in June 1944. The number of Knight's Cross conferments and heroic actions increased especially on the Eastern Front.



7. NCO Knight's
Cross recipients
overview, by war



1

(A) We now turn our focus to the different theaters in Europe, such as the Eastern Front, North Africa, Italy, Western Front, and the Home Front (Germany). This overview covers the Second World War in Europe from September 1939 through May 1945 and includes posthumous conferments.

(B) The numbers reflect the battle intensity during the war in Europe. Therefore, the numbers of Knight's Cross recipients increased and decreased with the battle action and the numbers of month in the actual theater.

(C) After the Allied invasion in Italy in 1943 and in Normandy in 1944, the war in Europe intensified on the Southern and Western Fronts, until the unconditional surrender of Germany in May 1945.

D. Comparison of the highly decorated NCOs in the United States Armed Forces and the German Armed Forces.

On the previous pages, I examined the Medal of Honor recipients in the United States Armed Forces from 1941 until 1945 and the Knight's Cross recipients in the German Armed Forces from 1939 until 1945. The numbers of conferments reflect the important and significant role of highly decorated NCOs in two different armies during the Second World War for their NCO Corps and the public. The U.S. Armed Forces honored their Soldiers equally by each rank group for personal bravery on the battlefield, for their sacrifices, and their ability to take over a higher command and for taking "charge."

"Awarded in the name of Congress to a person who, while a member of the Armed Services, distinguished himself conspicuously by gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life beyond the call of duty while engaged in an action against any enemy of the United States."

The German Armed Forces, on the other hand, honored their Soldiers more or less for an individual decision to act on their own initiative, outstanding

personal bravery, and decisive success. Awards to Soldiers of lower ranks for exceptional acts of gallantry which decisively affect combat actions were the exception. The low number of conferments in the rank groups of sergeants and junior enlisted soldiers are tell us the truth.

“The Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross can be awarded to soldiers of each rank for exceptional acts of gallantry which decisively affect combat actions. The conditions for this are: Individual decision to act on ones own initiative, outstanding personal bravery and decisive success in the context of the overall conduct of the action.”

Now I will try to find answers to the questions I have asked before, never-the-less, the reader is still free to come to his or her own conclusions from their analysis of the information presented on previous pages and to the following statements.

1. Are the NCOs the backbones of their armies and did their armies recognize this in awarding them an equal portion of their awards in combat?

Yes, they did! They were the masters on the battlefield and the masters in training young enlisted Soldiers and mentoring officers. The United States Armed Forces found a way to share an equal portion of their highest military awards with each of the three rank groups. It is nice to observe this, and hopefully it was not randomly. The German Armed Forces favored officers. The statistics bear this out.

2. Is bravery comparable from one army to another army?

No, it is not! There were different armies and two different awards given to their Soldiers in war as the highest military recognition. There were also two different societies with two different “Ways of Life.” A comparison is not possible, because of the different bestowal regulations and the different outcomes during the war. The U.S. Armed Forces honored Soldiers for the ultimate sacrifice given on the battlefield. Fifty-six point eight percent of conferments were to Soldiers after they died.

3. Do tough and bloody battles result in the award of more than the average number of medals on both sides of the battle?

Yes they do! The Battle of the Bulge, December 1944 until February 1945, is a good example. Noncommissioned officers performed heroically on both sides. In this particular timeframe, an almost identical number of NCOs received the highest military award of each country. On the American side, 17 sergeants received the Medal of Honor and 14 German sergeants received the Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross for their outstanding personal bravery in the face of the enemy.

Noncommissioned officers played a significant role in these two Armed Forces and they will in the future as well. NCOs are the link between the officers and the enlisted men. NCOs are trained and educated to lead troops on every level and to take charge and responsibility in any given situation. Therefore, it is necessary to give them an appropriate place and recognition in our history!

I dedicate this pamphlet to all noncommissioned officers in the German Armed Forces and the United States Armed Forces who fought and died during the Second World War in their effort to do the right thing for their respective countries.

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The Noncommissioned Officer Candidate Course

SGM Israr Choudhri

FA: SGM Martin Carpenter

M04

28 February 2005

Outline

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During the mid-1960's the United States was fighting a war in Vietnam. By 1966 the war in Vietnam was depleting the United States Army's noncommissioned officer corps. The attrition of combat, the 12-month tour limit in Vietnam, administrative separations of senior noncommissioned officers and the 25-month stateside stabilization policy began to take its toll. Without a call up of the reserve forces, Vietnam was becoming the regular Army's war. The United States Army was faced with a serious dilemma: should experienced NCOs be sent back into combat sooner or should they be replaced in the field with senior PFCs and specialists? The Army was running out of noncommissioned officers fast and demand was exceeding the supply, most noticeably in the combat specialties.

In 1967, the Army developed a solution to reduce the shortage of NCO leaders in Vietnam. The solution was the Infantry Noncommissioned Officers Course (INCOC), which was based on the idea of selecting qualified young men who would be trained extensively in the art of leadership and then off to Vietnam to lead teams and squads of infantry soldiers in combat. Initially the INCOC was implemented just for infantry sergeants at Fort Benning, Georgia. Later this course was introduced at other combat arms training centers, e.g., Fort Bliss, Fort Knox, Fort Leonard Wood and Fort Sill.

The INCOC concept paralleled the Officer Candidate Course (OCS) where an enlisted man could attend OCS after basic and advanced training if he was recommended or otherwise accepted. The Army assumed that there must be a large pool of capable soldiers coming through the system who would have made good officers except they missed the OCS entry by a few points on the school's IQ requirement. The INCOC was designed to take aggressive soldiers and give them the opportunity to train as combat leaders. Selected candidates would be given 23 weeks of intensive training qualifying them to lead squad and fire teams.

Candidates were selected from groups of initial entry training (IET) soldiers who had a security clearance of confidential, and infantry score of 100 or higher, and demonstrated leadership potential. Based on recommendations, the unit commander could select potential NCOs but not all were volunteers. Those selected to attend the course were immediately appointed corporal and later promoted to sergeant upon graduation from Phase One. The few who graduated with honors were promoted to staff sergeant.

Who came up with the concept of the course? In his book *About Face* COL David Hackworth calls this course "his baby" (Hackworth 594). According to Hackworth, his most significant achievements were the creation and implementation of the Infantry Noncommissioned Officers Course. After brainstorming the problem of shortages of junior NCOs in Vietnam, he, with the help of his boss Hank Emerson, designed the NCO Candidate Course to allow soldiers with leadership potential to be trained as squad and platoon sergeants. He said that the course was modeled on the Officer Candidate Course, and in order to get it going quickly as possible, much of OCS's support system (instructors, curriculum, etc.) was used.

The first Sergeant Major of the Army, William Wooldridge, describes the conception of NCOCC as a result of a conversation he had with LTG Jonathan O. Seaman, Commanding General, II Field Force, at Long Binh, Vietnam, in December 1966. According to SMA Wooldridge, he took the idea directly to the Chief of Staff General Harold K. Johnson, who in turn sent LTG Lawrence J. Lincoln, Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, to discuss the details with SMA Wooldridge. As a result LTG Lincoln and his office personnel prepared a concept memo for approval that resulted in the development of the course. SMA Wooldridge stated that there was no discussion by LTG Seaman of modeling the course after OCS but there was a parallel between OCS and the NCOCC.

Army Chief of Staff Johnson approved the concept of this course on 22 June 1967. The first NCOCC class began training on 5 September 1967, and graduated on 25 November 1967. The last class graduated on 18 March 1972. SMA Wooldridge considers this course one of the most noteworthy accomplishments of his tenure.

The NCOCC was divided into two phases. Phase I was 12 weeks of intensive hands-on training, broken down into three basic segments. The tasks included physical training, hand-to-hand combat, weapons, first aid, map reading, communications, and "call for fire." The second basic segment focused

on fire team, squad and platoon tactics. Out of 300 hours of instruction, more than 80 percent was conducted in the field. The final basic segment consisted of a full week of patrols, ambush preparation, creation of defensive perimeters, and land navigation.

Throughout the 12 weeks of training, leadership was instilled in all the tasks students trained on. A student chain of command was set up and the TAC NCOs closely supervised the performance of the candidates. After successfully completing Phase I, the top five percent of a class could be promoted to the rank of staff Sergeant after an interview by a panel of officers. The remainder, about 68 percent, would be promoted to sergeant. Candidates who completed the 12 weeks of training but did not measure up to leadership standards left the course as E-4s.

After graduation from the formal course, the graduates were shipped out for more training as sergeants with infantry AIT (Advanced Individual Training) units through the States. This training provided the NCO candidates with more confidence and made them apply the leadership skills they had acquired. During this phase candidates were constantly counseled and evaluated and their rank could be increased or reduced based on their performance. After this phase, the graduates of NCOCC were ready to deploy. There they would take the live-fire test in the jungles of Vietnam as fire team or squad leaders.

The duties and responsibilities of these new sergeants were no different than those of seasoned noncommissioned officers with twice their experience. These young sergeants who graduated from the NCOCC were met with resentment from middle grade NCOs who had worked for years to get their stripes. These new sergeants were referred to as “Shake and Bake NCOs” (Parker 11) because of the speed in which they made rank. They had their work cut out for them because they knew that they were under the microscope and their performance in combat would determine the amount of respect they would receive from the old-timers.

The majority of NCOCC graduates were assigned as assistant fire team leaders upon their arrival in Vietnam, and then they rapidly advanced to squad or platoon sergeants. They were responsible for the lives of many young soldiers. Unlike Korea and World War II, Vietnam was not a senior commander’s war that covered large spans of terrain. Vietnam was a junior leader’s war, limited to small areas of operation, with the brunt of the fighting falling on the shoulders of junior officers and noncommissioned officers.

The duty of these school-trained sergeants was to keep their men alive each day for a year. They led patrols in the jungles of Vietnam, set up ambushes and ensured that their men on guard at night were vigilant. Lt. Glenn Troester, a platoon leader in the 4th Infantry Division compliments his platoon sergeant, SSG Dwight Davis (NCOCC 37-69), in an article written for “Ivy Leaves”, the newspaper of the 4th Infantry Division. “It was Sergeant Davis who helped me during those terrifying first days, the days when I had to appear cool, confident and competent in front of my platoon” (Troester 6). He describes his platoon sergeant as a competent leader who cared about his men, checked their equipment and ensured they had proper supplies. Lt. Troester’s compliment to his

platoon sergeant is a testament to the abilities of a NCOCC graduate, who was given a mission to lead young men into harm's way and successfully accomplished his mission.

Four graduates of the NCOCC were awarded the Medal of Honor for heroic actions in combat. One of them was SSG Hammett Lee Bowen. SSG Bowen was a graduate of NCOCC Class 4-69 and was assigned to 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry. He was killed in action on 27 June 1969 in Vietnam. His citation reads:

"SSG Bowen distinguished himself while serving as Platoon Sergeant of Charlie Company 2/14th Infantry, 25th Infantry Division. Sergeant Bowen's platoon was advancing on a reconnaissance mission into enemy controlled terrain when it came under the withering cross fire of small arms and grenades, from an enemy ambush force. Sergeant Bowen placed heavy suppressive fire on the enemy position and ordered his men to fall back. As the platoon was moving back, an enemy grenade was thrown amid Sergeant Bowen and three of his men. Sensing the danger to his comrades, Sergeant Bowen shouted a warning to his men and hurled himself on the grenade, absorbing the explosion with his body while saving the lives of his fellow soldiers. SSG Bowen's extraordinary courage and concern for his men at the cost of his own life served as inspiration to his comrades and are in the highest tradition of military service and the United States Army."

SMA William Wooldridge, in his speech to the first graduating class of NCOCC stated, "I am often asked these days, why we are in Vietnam? I have found what I believe to be a good soldierly answer to that question. On one of my recent trips to Vietnam, I asked a young infantryman why he was in Vietnam. He smiled and said, "That's no problem. One morning my sergeant came into the barracks and said, pack your bags, you're going to Vietnam, and here I am" (Wooldridge). SMA Wooldridge told the new graduates of the first NCOCC that great things were expected of them and that besides being the first class, they were also the first group who were trained this way. In his view it had been a whole new idea in training.

COL Jay M. Parker in a recent article in Army magazine states, "during Vietnam, much was said about so-called shake and bake NCOs, and much of it was untrue and unfair. Clearly, there were those who were not ready to wear those stripes. However, many, many more served with courage and dedication both on the battlefield and in key staff jobs during one of the most difficult periods in our Army's history" (Parker 11).

SMA Wooldridge stated that NCOCC met a need in time of war and that the small infantry unit leader was more vital than ever before. After the Vietnam conflict ended, some of the NCOCC graduates stayed on and helped rebuild the Army into today's professional force. I, as an infantry NCO, am indebted to those leaders who lived through those hard times and to the great leaders who had the vision to educate our noncommissioned officer corps. Truly, today we are the backbone of the Army because "fortunately, a younger, tougher, smarter generation of NCOs and officers dragged us, sometimes kicking and screaming, into the future" (Parker 12).

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GySgt Carlos Hathcock II
United States Marine Corps Sniper

MSG Ron Stoner

FA: SGM Michael Huffman
Room M08
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As soldiers, we look to other military members as models to emulate. These individuals are found throughout our American history and scattered throughout our military services. The history of Gunnery Sergeant Carlos Hathcock of the United States Marine Corps (USMC) is not a story of a simple, single act of heroism, but rather a career of continuing and outstanding accomplishments. He served as one of the best Marine snipers during the Vietnam War. Working alone or as a sniping pair, he was always the consummate professional. He completed two tours of Vietnam and was credited with 93 confirmed enemy kills, the highest number for a Marine Corps sniper during that conflict (Carlos Hathcock). In addition, he used innovative ways to advance the field craft of the sniper, through weapons and training. Ironically, the only decoration for valor that he won was for saving, not taking, lives. During an ambush, he risked his life to save others when he evacuated Marines from a burning APC. GySgt Carlos Hathcock was a Noncommissioned Officer who provides an example of what a leader can be, could be and most importantly, should be.

Background/Duties/Training - He was born on May 20, 1942, in a tiny farming community near Little Rock, Arkansas. Mostly from a common European background, there was a mix of Cherokee Indian in his blood. Even as a child, Carlos Hathcock was gifted with the abilities of a keen eye, quick reflexes and accurate aim. At age ten, he was already hunting the area around his grandmother's farm in Geyer Springs, Ark., with consistently successful results. Always drawn towards the military and specifically the Marine Corps, at age 17 he signed up in the spring of 1959 and was soon to become a "Hollywood" Marine. Bound for the San Diego Marine Corps Recruitment Depot for 13 weeks of boot camp, he completed it and afterwards finished an additional infantry school. His first assignment was as a machine gunner for a weapons platoon in Hawaii, which placed him near the thing that he loved the most, an arsenal.

While there, he attended and graduated from the USMC Scout/Sniper School. Quickly becoming recognized as an expert marksman, in 1962 he was reassigned to the Marine Corp Air Station at Cherry Point, North Carolina. At this base, he was given the opportunity to compete on the All Marine Champion Cherry Point Shooting Team. Within three years he won the Marine Corps Interservice and National Service Championships. In fact, he set the record on the post "A" course by shooting 248 points of a possible 250 - a record never

matched again. In August 1965, he competed at the National Matches at Camp Perry, Ohio. It was there that he won the 1,000-yard National High-Powered Rifle Championship - the Wimbledon Cup of marksmanship, over 2,600 competitors. This was the beginning of his career as one of the most dangerous military men in the world: a Marine with patience, resolve, and a high-powered rifle. He would soon find that as a sniper, he needed all of these attributes and weapons in the jungles of Vietnam. However, to understand the sniper in modern conflict, we must first understand the tools of his trade.

Weapons - GySgt Hathcock was sent to Vietnam at a time when the American military was evaluating not only the weapons of the sniper, but also the sniper's role on the modern battlefield. Hathcock basically used four weapon models during his duty as a sniper and the following shows the rapid evolution of the tools used by the sniper.

The first was the M-1C.

Snipers achieved reasonably consistent results with the 30-06 caliber M1C. This was a modification of the Garand M1 used during WWII. The range was between 400-600 yards, with 600 being the maximum effective range using the M82 Telescope.

The second rifle used was the Model 70 Winchester

Snipers achieved increased distance with the .30-06 with the Unertl 10x scope. This was a civilian rifle then being evaluated as a possible replacement to the M-1C. The range was extended to 600-800 yards.

The third rifle used was the M40.

Snipers achieved increased distance with the 7.62x51mm NATO (308 Win) caliber M40. The range was 600-800 yards, with 800 yards as the maximum effective range. Scopes included the Redfield 3-9X and the Unertl 10x.

The fourth weapon was the M2. The Browning M2 .50 caliber (12.7mm) machine gun has a maximum effective range of 3,000 meters. GySgt Hathcock modified the weapon by adding scope mounts that he had assisted in designing and had specially made in Vietnam. A Unertl or Lyman scope was attached and he would fire using the single-round mode. In fact, until 2003, Hathcock held the world record for the longest documented sniping. He engaged an enemy soldier at 2,500 yards using the M2 and it was recorded as a confirmed kill. In fact, it was Hathcock that popularized the use of the M2 to such an extent, that superiors reconsidered the use of the .50 cal. gun in an expanded sniper role. Currently the M82A1M (Barrett) is used as an anti-materiel weapon and EOD purposes, but it can also be used as an anti-sniper weapon. GySgt Hathcock used whatever tools were available to increase his abilities to accomplish the mission.

Deeds - GySgt Hathcock started his first tour in Southeast Asia in late 1965. Soon he was gaining a reputation for successful operations against the enemy. One notable case was when he tracked a Vietnamese sniper that was creating havoc within the American lines. This sniper had not only been killing U.S. servicemen, but was boldly establishing ambushes and capturing soldiers to gather intelligence. Brutal torture was then used to extract information from the

captured Marines about troop strengths and resources. Based on her vicious techniques as an interrogator, she gained the name “The Apache,” and was one of the most successful Viet Cong snipers. The American troops were terrified to patrol the area because of her atrocities.

By careful planning, patience and skill, GySgt Hathcock was able to eliminate not only the sniper, but all of her team during a difficult, near-dusk encounter. He did this by concentrating in an area where he believed she would return. While establishing a sniping blind, he saw a single enemy scout move through a marked trail. However, in an “unprofessional and childish” act, he fought with his partner over who would shoot the soldier. This only alerted the scout and he was able to flee back to his boss, “The Apache.” She returned with her team to capture what she believed to be easy prey. As she was sneaking into the established kill zone, her movement was detected. Hathcock called in artillery and placed it behind her. This cut off an escape to the rear. In attempting to get away, she ran directly into Hathcock and his sniping partner. Hathcock killed her with two shots. His use of artillery and sniping skills eliminated a dangerous seven-member team that late afternoon. His killing of the enemy sniper stabilized the area for months afterwards.

However, things were about to change quickly for the American rifleman. Convinced to do an interview for the U.S. military publication “Sea Tiger” in 1967, the journalist writing the expose assured Hathcock that the article distribution would remain within military channels. Carlos was taken by surprise when his wife wrote to him shortly thereafter that the article, almost word for word, was published in the local paper back in the states. This was disturbing because Hathcock had been telling his wife that he was working as a MP in a rear area. He had taken this approach because he wanted to isolate his wife from the brutal realism regarding the dangerous and brief life of a sniper. This was an alarming incident. But even more alarming was that within months, local flyers in Vietnam were offering a reward for the death of Long Tr’ang, the word that meant “white feather.” Hathcock had taken to wearing a feather from a local bird in his boonie cap. This was his small way to defy the enemy and challenge them to match his skills in the field.

The Viet Cong had given him this name and placed a bounty worth three years wages (about \$10,000) for his capture - dead or alive. Military Intelligence even reported at one time that a platoon of North Vietnamese Army (NVA) snipers had been trained to specifically eliminate Hathcock. In a later incident, one of the best Viet Cong snipers tracked Carlos and his partner through thick jungle in a two-day hunt. The final conclusion has become sniper legend and also Hollywood script. In a constantly shrinking kill zone, the snipers encircled one another, waiting for the other to make a fatal mistake. While concealed in a low gully, the NVA sniper saw a small white feather as he peered through his scope. As he slightly moved his rifle to make the final adjustment before his killing shot, the sunlight reflected from his scope.

Seeing the flash from the reflection, Hathcock quickly raised his rifle, took rapid aim and sent a single round down range. After scoping the area for other

enemy movement, Hathcock and his partner moved to the site. His partner found that Hathcock had placed the round straight through the tube of the scope into the eye of the enemy sniper. Of course, the only way Hathcock could have accomplished this shot, was by firing at the same moment that the enemy was sighting his rifle on Hathcock. It was a battle of life and death based on seconds. This was another close brush with death, but this didn't deter him from going back into the jungle. He did not shrink from his duty and was more determined than ever to accomplish his mission.

Duty was his way of life. Once, while providing sniper support for Operation Rio Blanco, Hathcock worked tirelessly to provide a force multiplier to the troops as he used his extraordinary ability to connect with the enemy. He remained with the troops after the original three-day operation ended and continued to devastate the enemy over the next few weeks. In many of these operations, he would go into the jungle alone for long stretches at a time.

In fact, Hathcock was so focused on his task, that he would come in with one squad and catch another going out and fall right in with them. However, his self-imposed high Operations Tempo (OPTEMPO) put a burden on his physical well-being. He finally had to be placed under arrest and returned back to the company area for his own safety. When he arrived back at the sniper platoon base, his commander barely recognized the gaunt and hollow Marine. Hathcock had lost so much weight that his uniform hung off of his shoulders and hips. With his eyes sunk deep into his sockets, he looked like an old man. He had started the operation with 32 kills and within a month finished with 63 confirmed. He was placed under house arrest until he physically recovered. He was only 24-years-old at the time.

The most significant event in his life happened in 1969, while into his second 13-month tour in Vietnam. He had returned to Vietnam after an absence of one year and was immediately assigned to the 7th Marine Sniper Platoon. On arrival, he found a rag-tag group of Marines that had previously failed so badly at their sniping mission; they had been reassigned to daily details instead of engaging the enemy in the field. He immediately reorganized and retrained the snipers to such a high level that within months the sniper platoon set a Marine record of 72 confirmed kills for the month of July 1969.

Things appeared to be back on track, but a major change was about to happen. On 16 September, Hathcock was waiting at his base camp preparing for a sniper mission, when an opportunity arose for him and his partner to accompany a Marine patrol.

At first he declined, but then changed his mind thinking that he could help the patrol and still be back in time to complete the sniping operation. Climbing aboard the third armored personnel carrier (APC), he was in the middle of six APC convoy that left that morning. A Marine lieutenant in charge ordered the patrol to move out and they left the base camp. Hathcock chose to remain outside the APC and sat on top of the vehicle scanning the road ahead (Henderson).

Further down the route, the lieutenant decided to turn off the main road and follow a trail into the jungle. The path had been made by another patrol earlier that morning. One after another, the transports left the highway. As the third APC started its turn off the road, there was an earth-shattering explosion. They had run over a 500-pound mine. Over 50 Marines scrambled for cover as they started taking fire from the nearby trees. Hathcock saw a 40-foot high column of fire rise from the APC on which he and seven other Marines were riding. Even though his eyes were opened, he couldn't see anything because of the smoke and flames. He could feel the flames around him singeing his hair and skin. However, he couldn't escape the burning wreck because his legs were pinned down. He realized that it was the body of the lieutenant trapping him in place.

Without thinking about his own safety, he grabbed the young officer by his flaming clothes and hurled him off the side. He then found his sniping partner and threw him clear of the fire. Remaining at the APC, he reached additional Marines and tossed four more out of the burning wreck. By now, Hathcock was on fire. His trousers were aflame and he could feel the flames at his chest, arms and neck. As another explosion occurred, he blindly jumped through a wall of flames into the gravel, landed hard and rolled. He knew that he had to get away from the burning vehicles. As he stood, he couldn't understand why he felt like he was weighted down and wet. It was because his skin now hung down from his arms. He quickly realized the extent of his injuries. Other Marines responded and doused him with water that was nearby and quick action by a medic saved his life. Because of the isolated area, he walked assisted to a clearing where he was evacuated by helicopter to the hospital ship, the USS Repose. The difficult part was just beginning. After a series of hospital transfers, he found himself at the burn center at the Brooke Army Hospital in San Antonio, Texas.

Arriving with a 102-degree fever and 43 percent of his body with "full thickness" burns he suffered through weeks of numerous skin grafts. He went through 13 corrective operations and numerous bouts with infections.

He was the example of selfless service. After his recovery, he reported for duty at Quantico, Va., in January 1970 as a marksmanship instructor. Over the course of the next few years, he experienced dizziness, exhaustion and an occasional loss of muscle control, but continued to serve for his "kids and the Corps." For years he was told that his medical problems were due to the burns he had suffered. However, after additional testing, he was later diagnosed with multiple sclerosis. In 1979, while instructing at the Marine Scout/Sniper School at Quantico, Virginia, he collapsed while evaluating students in a field exercise.

The Marine Corps felt that it could no longer allow him to remain on active duty. He was released from duty with 19 years, 10 months of service. He was two months short of a full 20-year retirement.

Gunnery Sgt. (Ret.) Carlos N. Hathcock II, USMC, died on February 23, 1999, after a long decline in the grip of the only enemy he wasn't able to kill: multiple sclerosis (Sniper Central). His name had been submitted for the Medal of Honor due to his actions in the 1969 ambush, but the award was downgraded to a Silver Star. But he is most recognized for the contributions that he made as

an NCO. And this is shown in his legacy. The Marine Corps named its annual marksmanship award after Carlos Hathcock. A Marine library as a center of learning in Washington, D.C. carries his name. In 1990 a Marine unit raised \$5,000 in donations to fight multiple sclerosis. They brought the proceeds to his home the old-fashioned way, the Marine way: They ran 216 miles from Camp Lejeune, N.C., to Virginia Beach, Va. They did this for an NCO who provided an example of what a leader can be, could be, and most importantly, should be.

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**NCOs in the American Army (1945-Present)
Contributions of the Unsung NCO**

MSG Tabitha Scrivens

FA: CSM (Ret.) Sylvester Smith

L03

28 February 2005

The contributions of the unsung noncommissioned officer (NCO) are immeasurable. Men and women of the Combat Service Support (CSS) Corps have selflessly served their country for hundreds of years with little recognition. This article defines the unsung NCO and explores the background and contributions of the female NCO as an unsung NCO.

Most people are familiar with the term unsung hero. Webster's Dictionary defines "hero" as a person admired for his courage and nobility. The unsung hero is usually depicted in narrative fiction as a person who performs ordinary acts that serve a greater purpose. Without those acts the greater good would not occur. History must assert that the unsung NCO is in fact an unsung hero. These NCOs perform their duties to the best of their abilities, but are never lauded for their efforts. They do not receive sufficient recognition from the pages of history. This characterization perfectly describes a specific group of NCOs. The contributions of CSS NCOs to the success of American Armies have often been overlooked by both historians and the public (Westover iv). CSS NCOs are the enlisted leaders of the Corps of Engineers, the Transportation Corps, the Chemical Corps, the Signal Corps, the Medical Corps, the Ordnance Corps, and the Quartermaster Corps.

The Army requires approximately six CSS soldiers to support one infantry soldier. The CSS NCO and their soldiers are tasked to support the offense at all costs. Long thought of as the soldiers that remain "in the rear with the gear" while real soldiers go to war, the CSS NCO has the daunting task of assisting in establishing logistics command and control and in providing support. The CSS NCOs, in their particular field, may be responsible for furnishing supplies, maintenance, transportation, medical, or field services to forward units. In addition to doctrinal missions, these NCOs also provide humanitarian support.

"Enlisted personnel rarely emerge as individuals. When they do, it is almost inevitably because of heroic acts in combat. Because enlisted women are relatively few and are not assigned to combat they are both individually and collectively and unknown quantity" (Judith Stiem 11). The pages of history have neglected the enlisted women, especially the female noncommissioned officer.

The female NCO long struggled to gain recognition for her efforts and dedication to duty. In today's Army, there are over "82 women that wear the wreathed star of the command sergeant major (CSM) in the middle of their chevrons" (Marcia Triggs, "Army Responsibilities"). However, it has been a long road for women to reach this point.

The Women's Army Auxiliary Corps was established in May 1942. It later became the Women's Army Corps (WAC). From the first days of establishing the WAC, the politically correct image of the female soldier has been vital to the Army and its members. Women NCOs have had to exercise strict discipline concerning their personal and professional lives. From their first moments in an all-male world, women have had to be cognizant of the affect their behavior and attitudes have had on the Army and the public's opinion of women in the military. Women were aware of the strict rules governing their behavior and the effect their behavior had on the image of the Army. This adherence to personal and professional discipline was strictly enforced. For example, until 1971, women were automatically discharged from the Army if they became pregnant or married (Betty Morden, Women's 58).

The task of establishing adequate and appropriate training for women has been fraught with difficulty. The Department of the Army reduced male and WAC basic training to eight weeks from 13 weeks in 1950 (Morden, Women's 101). In 1954, the WAC Center and School was activated, establishing the first permanent home for WACs (Morden, "History"). The center conducted basic training, clerk-typists, stenography, personnel specialist, leadership, and cadre courses for enlisted soldiers and NCOs. Throughout the history of the Army, examples may be found where women were not trained sufficiently to meet the demands of their positions or missions. Consider the situation of the women assigned to the Vietnam WAC unit's camp. None of the women, to include its officers and NCOs received any combat training prior to their assignment to Vietnam. The camp endured constant artillery barrages, but the women adjusted and completed their assigned mission (Morden, "History").

Significant strides were made in the training of the WAC NCO Corps during the late 1960s. A four-week leadership course was initiated at Ft. McClellan, Alabama in 1968. In 1972, the course was discontinued and women were allowed to attend the same leadership courses as their male counterparts (Morden, "History").

Assigning women duties in the Army has been plagued with the same difficulty as the type of training women received. During the Korean War, NCOs and other enlisted women performed duties as telephone operators, cashiers, motor vehicle operators, mechanics, medical specialists, finance clerks, photographers, and supply specialists. In 1978, the Army opened noncombat military occupation specialties (MOSs) to women (Morden, "History"). However, by 1990, women only served in 52 percent of the MOSs in the Army (Carolyn Becraft). In October 1994, the Clinton Administration successfully rescinded the "Risk Rule," which was used to determine which assignments should be closed to women. Ninety-one percent of the career fields became gender neutral and allowed women to get closer to armed combat action (Triggs, "Female Soldiers").

When women first began serving in the Army, weapons training was not mandatory, and women did not receive an assigned weapon. Prior to 1963, women were allowed to volunteer to fire the M1 Carbine, which was the Army's assigned light individual weapon at that time. Women also received weapons

familiarization training. However, when the M1 Carbine (9 lbs. in weight) was replaced by the M14 rifle (10 lbs.), weapons familiarization and voluntary firing of small arms was deleted from WAC training. The Army considered the M14 too heavy for women. In July 1974, voluntary weapons familiarization and firing was reinstated on the M16 rifle. Weapons familiarization and qualification became mandatory for WACs in July 1975 (Morden, "History"). By the early 1980s, female CSS NCOs were regularly using hand guns, machine guns, grenade launchers as well as the M16 rifle (Holm 273-274).

At the end of WWII roughly 280,000 women were in service. Unfortunately, they had many obstacles to overcome. Women couldn't give orders to men, their pay was less and their ranks were different. Their role in the military reflected their role in American society. By 1947, the number of women in military service declined to 14,500 (Morden, "History").

In 1948, President Truman signed into law the Women's Armed Service Integration Act, providing for regular and reserve status of women in the Armed Services. By the time America entered the Korean Conflict, women were trained and ready to go to war, functioning mostly as nurses, but many others served as NCOs working as stenographers, aides, and interpreters (Morden, "History").

"At the end of the Korean War, the Pentagon began a phase-out, reducing the number of Americans in uniform, including women." For many years of the next decade, women duties in the service became "beauty contests." Personal appearance outweighed military ability. After the cease fire was signed in 1953, training of women in the Army became inundated with frivolous subjects. Bivouac and other military training hours were shared with make-up lessons. Courses on choosing the best shade of lipstick and nail polish to blend with the uniform replaced survival training and firing arms. In July 1963, women again no longer received weapons or survival training. Additionally, physical training emphasized keeping "girlish figures firm and trim, rather than building a soldier's endurance and strength" (Vickie Lewis 113).

Although the decade after the Korean War was fraught with difficulty for female soldiers and NCOs, they made some advances. WACs in the ranks of E6 and above were allowed to serve in non-WAC units and Carolyn James became the first WAC promoted to sergeant major (SGM) (Morden, "History").

At the onset of the Vietnam War, women fought for the "right to be in the fight" (Lewis 117). With the exception of nursing personnel, American women had not been allowed near a combat zone since WWII. Eventually, several hundred soldiers and NCOs of the Women's Army Corps were allowed to serve in Vietnam. At this time, there were many accomplishments by the WAC and its NCOs. Although, the majority of the women were nurses, many served as NCOs in other service support roles, including military intelligence. Master Sergeant Betty Adams was the first female WAC NCO to arrive in Vietnam (Morden, "History"). Her primary role was to assist the Republic of Vietnam in organizing and training the Vietnam Women's Armed Forces Corps. In 1967, members of the Vietnam WAC Detachment began to arrive in the country. The

unit remained at Long Binh until 1972. In 1968, Yzetta Nelson, sergeant major of the WAC training battalion was the first WAC appointed to command sergeant major in the Regular Army and in 1973 SGM Betty Benson was the first female to graduate from the United States Army Sergeants Major Academy (Morden, "History").

More advances came in the years to come. A common basic training program for male and female recruits was approved in 1977. Although this practice was discontinued in 1982, it reappeared as "gender integrated training" in 1994 (Wilson).

For more than 200 years, American women have served on the battlefield beside men and have been shot and killed. It's only been in the last 21 years, that women finally were able to shoot back. The onset of Operations Urgent Fury, Just Cause, Desert Shield, Desert Storm, Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom have demonstrated the mettle and fortitude of the female soldier and NCO.

One such NCO is Sergeant First Class (SFC) Linda Ann Tarango-Griess of Sutton, Nebraska. Known as an outstanding leader and an NCO dedicated to her soldiers, SFC Tarango-Griess lost her life on June 11, 2004 near Sammara, Iraq, when an improvised explosive device detonated near her convoy while enroute to perform a maintenance mission. She is one of many American women that have been killed while defending their country (Fowler).

When contemplating the validity of the CSS female NCO as an unsung hero, one must consider SFC Tarango-Griess as well as other women throughout the history of the Army.

During the Vietnam War, Specialist 5 (SPC5) Offut "risked her life to rescue Vietnamese adults and children from burning structures. Without regard for personal safety...she repeatedly entered buildings to rescue children..." For this heroic act, she was given a certificate of achievement and informed that women did not receive the Soldier's Medal. SPC5 Offut finally received the Soldier's Medal for her heroism in 2001 (Wilson).

Another woman who performed magnificently in the face of danger is SSG Joan Hahnenberg. On 17 Nov 1988, in the Azores, she saved the life of a fellow crewmember aboard the Army vessel, LT-981, after an accident. She placed herself in a position of extreme danger outside the bulwark of the vessel. She was able to grab and hold onto a crewmember while he was in the water and held this position for several moments until assistance arrived. While holding onto the soldier, SSG Hahnenberg was in danger of being injured and tossed into the sea by the tow cable. Her heroic act demonstrated her selfless service, personal courage and dedication to her soldiers and the Army (Wilson).

Heroes are persons that people admire, respect and strive to mirror in their own actions and life. Two such heroes to women NCOs are CSM Michele Jones and CSM Cynthia Pritchett. In October 2002, CSM Jones was the first woman selected as the U.S. Army Reserves top NCO. Recently named the Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan command sergeant major, CSM Pritchett has a vital role in the efforts of building a "stable and secure environment for Afghanistan's reconstruction" (Triggs, "Army...Responsibilities").

Female CSS NCOs have long contributed significantly to the success of our great Army. They are rarely sufficiently recognized publicly or historically. However, steps have recently been taken to honor the women that have served in our great military. The Women in Military Service Memorial was dedicated on 18 October 1997 in Washington, D.C., in honor of these great women.

The jobs performed by CSS NCOs are not glamorous and they do not capture the imagination of the historian or the public as fighting infantrymen have. History must recognize all soldiers and NCOs, for fighting infantrymen and the fighting combat arms do not win wars alone. Mr. Togo West, former Secretary of the Army, aptly described the service of the female soldier and NCO during the dedication of the Women's Memorial. "War is an uncertain business and yet on every uncertain day that our nation has had to face the grim business of defending itself, American women have stepped forward" (Lewis 1).

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SGT Peter Francisco
1760 – 1831

SGM Daniel Hagan

FA: SGM Reginald Daniel
 R03
 28 February 2005

“To Peter Francisco, a giant in stature, might, and courage who slew in this engagement eleven of the enemy with his own broad sword rendering himself thereby the most famous private soldier of the Revolutionary War.”¹

Inscription on Cavalry the Monument, Guilford Courthouse National Park,
 Virginia

The inscription to Peter Francisco on the Cavalry Monument is symbolic of the time-honored tradition of the professionalism and self-sacrifice made by courageous noncommissioned officers during the Revolutionary War. From such battlefields as Monmouth, Stony Point, Camden, and Guilford Courthouse, to the British surrender at Yorktown, Sergeant Peter Francisco truly lived up to the title as a “One Man Army.”

Peter Francisco was born in Porto Juedu on the island of Terceira, in the Azores in June 1761. At the age of five, he was kidnapped by pirates and taken to Ireland. He resolved to go to America where he became an indentured servant to a sea captain who took him to Petersburg, Virginia. After residing in a poorhouse he was indentured to Judge Antoine Winston of Buckingham County, where he remained until the age of 16. On 23 June 1777 he requested, and was granted a release from indentured service so he could enlist in the Continental Army. He was assigned to the North Carolina militia.

Peter Francisco’s first taste of battle was during the Battle of the Brandywine on 17 September 1777 with the Marquis de Lafayette.² At six-foot, six-inches and weighing 260 pounds, he was deemed as the largest soldier in the militia. Francisco was wounded in this battle and shared a hospital bed with the Marquis. After a period of recuperation, he participated in the battle of Monmouth (now known as Freehold, New Jersey) where on 28 June 1778 he sustained his second wound of the war, a musket ball wound to his right thigh. Despite his being wounded twice, Peter Francisco went on to fight in the Battle of Stony Point on 15 July 1779.

The attack on Stony Point³ was led by General “Mad Anthony” Wayne. His strategy was to launch a “surprise” attack on the British stronghold on the Hudson River. Peter Francisco was part of the northern commando unit known as the “Forlorn Hopes” under the command of Lieutenant Gibbons. During the battle, he suffered his third wound of the war, a nine-inch gash to his stomach. In spite of his wound, he continued to fight and killed three enemy grenadiers

and captured the British flag. He remained in New York for the next several months, recuperating in Fishkill.

There is no historic evidence available of battles in which Peter Francisco fought during the period of December 1779 and 10 August 1780. Records show that when he was released from the hospital in Fishkill, his original term of service had expired, so he returned to Virginia. On 11 August 1780, Peter Francisco returned to active duty and was assigned under Colonel Mayo. Mayo and General Horatio Gates were making preparations for the battle of Camden.

Known as the “most disastrous defeat ever inflicted on an American Army,” (Gustaitis, 2) the battle of Camden was an utter Continental Army rout. But for Peter Francisco, it was one of his most courageous and controversial battles of the war. As most of the Virginia militia fled at the sight of Cornwallis’s advancing British columns, Peter Francisco and a handful of militia stayed and fought, including Colonel Mayo. Soon they were surrounded. Greatly outnumbered, they found themselves caught in a life or death situation. So, with his bayonet, he speared a mounted British cavalryman and threw him to the ground, took the horse and rode through the enemy lines pretending to be a Tory sympathizer. After catching up with his fleeing army, he stopped and picked up Colonel Mayo, saving him from the muskets of the British. Also, in a controversial act of strength, it was claimed that he lifted a 1,100-pound cannon from its carriage and carried it off the field so it would not fall into enemy hands (Medeiros, A06). Although an extreme claim U.S. Postal Service saw no reason to disbelieve the act and immortalized this feat in a 1975 commemorative postage stamp entitled “Peter Francisco, fighter extraordinary.”

As a result of saving Colonel Mayo’s life in the battle of Camden, Peter Francisco was awarded 1,000 acres of land located in Richland Creek, Virginia, and was promoted to the rank of sergeant. In addition to his newfound rank and status, Peter Francisco was also presented with a six-foot broadsword (with a five-foot blade) by a blacksmith under the direction of General George Washington. His use of the broadsword would later leave its mark on the fields of Guilford Courthouse.

General Nathaniel Greene, a proven military strategist and tactician, commanded the militia at the battle of Guilford Courthouse (known as the “bloodiest battle of the war”). His overall plan was to draw General Cornwallis’s British division as far north as possible, stretching the British supply lines to their absolute breaking point. Then he would turn and face the British. In addition, his plan called for a linkup with General Morgan’s militia at Salisbury thereby consolidating their forces for a faceoff with the British at Guilford Courthouse (Wood, 229). General Greene’s plan consisted of three separate defensive lines: the first made up of the North Carolina militia; the second of the Virginia militia; and the third comprised of the 1st, 2nd, and 5th Maryland Militia (USMA, 27).

Sergeant Peter Francisco was assigned under Colonel William Washington and posted at the third line of General Greene’s defensive line with the 5th Maryland Militia. During the course of the battle, the British broke through the

first line and routed the North Carolina militia north of the battlefield. Soon afterwards, the second line broke and the Virginia militia began fleeing the battlefield and into the woods. Next, Cornwallis's troops engaged upon the 5th Maryland Militia in fierce fighting. The British succeeded in breaking through the line. Benson Lassing in his 1850 Pictorial Field Book of the Revolution described Sergeant Francisco's actions: "*A brave Virginian, cut down eleven men in succession with his broadsword. One of the guards pinned Francisco's leg to his horse with a bayonet. Forbearing to strike, he assisted the assailant to draw his bayonet forth, when, with terrible force, he brought down his broadsword and cleft the poor fellow's head to his shoulders*" (Gustaitis, 3). Although wounded a fourth time, Sergeant Francisco continued to fight and killed two more British soldiers before being wounded a fifth time by a bayonet thrust into his right thigh, exiting at the socket of his hip. He was left to die on the battlefield until taken to a Quaker's home. After nursing his wounds, Sergeant Francisco departed Guilford for his home in Virginia. But instead decided to continue his service a third time by volunteering to act as a scout to monitor the Virginia operations of Banastre Tarleton and his horsemen. During a stop at an inn owned by Ben Ward, he was arrested by Tarleton's troops. Upon being ordered to remove his silver shoe buckles, Sergeant Francisco was quoted as saying, "take them yourself" (Gustaitis, 4). As they attempted to relieve him of his buckles, he drew the soldier's sword and cleft the soldier in the head. The wounded soldier fired his pistol and grazed Sergeant Francisco's side. It was his sixth wound of the war. Sergeant Francisco then grabbed one of the soldier's horses and escaped.

That was the end of Sergeant Francisco's service in the Revolutionary War. Although discharged from the service, he was present at the surrender of Cornwallis in Yorktown on 18 October 1781. Peter Francisco then returned to Virginia, married Susannah Anderson in December 1784, and resided at his 1,000-acre home in Richland Creek. In 1819 Congress awarded Peter Francisco a full pension for his military service. His wife Susannah died in 1784 after bearing him three sons and one daughter. He later remarried to Mary Grymes West and obtained the position of Sergeant at Arms for the Virginia Legislature.

Peter Francisco died on 18 January 1831, apparently from appendicitis and was laid to rest at Shockee Cemetery with full military honors outside of Richmond. The State Governor, the Senate, the House of Delegates, and numerous other prominent state and local officials attended his funeral. During his eulogy, the Reverend R.C. Moore took note of Francisco's "*degree of bodily strength, superior to that of any man of modern time... exerted in defense of a country which gave him [a home]*" (Gustaitis, 5). In 1909, the Guilford Battle Ground Company erected "Cavalry Monument" which bears an epitaph dedicated to the late sergeant and is located at the Guilford Courthouse National Park. In a law enacted by the Virginia Legislature in 1973, March 15 was designated as "Peter Francisco Day" as a tribute to the dedication, heroism, and patriotism of Sergeant Peter Francisco at the battle of Guilford Courthouse.

Sergeant Francisco's numerous acts of bravery, professionalism, and continued self-sacrifice in the many battles of the Revolution contributed significantly to the success of the Continental Army's eventual defeat of the British at the Battle of Yorktown. General Washington's comments about Sergeant Francisco sum up his distinguished career: "*Without him we would have lost two crucial battles, perhaps the war, and with it our freedom. He was truly a One Man Army*" (Medeiros, 2).

Footnotes

¹ The first inscription is dedicated to General Horatio Gates, Commander of the Militia at Guilford Courthouse.

² Lafayette would later visit Peter Francisco in 1819 in Richmond since they recuperated together after the battle of Brandywine.

³ Now known as West Point.

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Honoring Sergeant Carter: African American Hero Receives Medal of Honor

MSG Mohammed Elhaj

FA: CSM (Ret.) Robert Keehu
R08
25 February 2005

Long after he died, the United States Army awarded Sergeant First Class (SFC) Edward A. Carter the Medal of Honor, its highest honor for heroism in combat. Despite fighting courageously for a country he loved, the Army did not award the Medal of Honor to Carter—or any African American soldiers—during World War II (Carter and Allen, 2003). In 1993, the Army contracted with North Carolina's Shaw University to determine if there had been racial disparity in the way of awarding the Medal of Honor. Shaw's research team found that racial disparity was a major factor in denying many African Americans the Medal of Honor (Colley, 2003). The team further recommended the Army consider a group of 10 African-American soldiers for the Medal of Honor. Of those 10, the Army eventually recommended that seven receive the award. In October 1996, Congress passed the necessary legislation that allowed the President to award these medals since the statutory limit for presentation had expired. In a White House ceremony on 13 January 1997, President William J. Clinton presented the Medals of Honor posthumously to those seven African-American WWII heroes, including SFC Carter (US News and World Report, 1999). This research paper does not attempt to chronicle the full range of black contributions to America's military, for they are substantial. Rather, it presents a brief overview of what SFC Carter, contributed to our great Army.

Carter, a man of American, Anglo and Indian decent and the son of missionary parents, was born in Los Angeles in 1916. He had a troubled childhood and a strained relationship with his parents (Carter and Allen, 2003). His mother left when he was a young boy. Her departure affected him deeply and probably caused him to channel his anger and energy into his soldiering. Although Carter was not an affectionate man (Carter and Allen, 2003), he learned how to balance his commitment to the country with the responsibilities that come with having a family. After all, even the toughest and most focused Soldiers have weak spots for their families.

Carter's military experience started when his parents took him to China where he attended a military school in Shanghai. In 1933, after his father divorced his mother, Carter ran away from home and joined the Chinese Nationalist Army fighting the Japanese. Revealing his young age to the Chinese, his father brought him back home. Carter, however, loved being a soldier and had other plans in mind. He ran away from home again and worked his way

aboard a merchant ship to Spain where he joined the Abraham Lincoln Brigade and fought in defense of the Republic of Spain in 1936 (Carter and Allen, 2003). Following General Francisco Franco's victory, Carter returned to America. He enlisted in the Army in September 1941 and shipped to Camp Wolters, Texas, where he surprised his drill instructors with his sharp weapons skills, discipline, and can-do attitude. From Texas, Carter shipped to Fort Benning, Georgia, and was assigned to the all-black 3535th Quartermaster Truck Company where he rose to the rank of staff sergeant. In 1942, Carter married Mildred Hoover, the widowed daughter of a well-known black Los Angeles family, whom Carter had dated in Los Angeles.

Meanwhile in Europe, in the early months of 1945, the long and bitter struggle against Nazi Germany reached a decisive stage. Allied forces launched a massive assault on the Rhineland as they prepared to push into the heart of the Third Reich. With the heavy casualties suffered by white Soldiers at the Battle of the Bulge, black Soldiers, for the first time, played a major combat role. Sergeant Carter was right in the thick of the battle as he fought with a zealous fearlessness to help secure the Rhine and stop the Nazis in their tracks. Carter was so eager to get into the fight, he volunteered daily for combat duty. The Army finally accepted him after the Battle of the Bulge, but at the cost of his sergeant's stripes. His commander reduced him to the rank of private so he would be unable to supervise white troops. Despite that, Carter was a role model for others. His peers and superiors respected him. His uniforms were always neat and his medals shiny. During the White House ceremony, his wartime commanding officer remembered him as "a real Soldier who soldiered 24 hours a day. He was one of the best Soldiers I've ever seen" (Carter and Allen, 2003). Carter's truck company finally went to Europe in 1944 and he was among the first chosen for assignment to the 56th Armored Infantry Battalion, Provisional Company 1 (also known as Dog Company), attached to the 12th Armored Division, Third Army, commanded by General George Patton.

One of the division's combat objectives was to capture the bridge over the river at the town of Speyer where German resistance stiffened. Eighty-eight millimeter artillery fire from a warehouse hit his armored column as it advanced toward the town. Some 150 yards of open field lay between the armored column and the warehouse. Armed with a Thompson submachine gun and a few hand grenades, Carter engaged the enemy with his four-man team. The enemy killed two members of his squad and wounded the third. Exposed and without protective fire, Carter dashed ahead, firing at the Germans when a bullet pierced his left arm. Risking his own life, he charged the enemy again, firing and tossing grenades at the Germans until he silenced the gun that wounded him. However, two more bullets from another position in the warehouse hit him. Despite his serious wounds and pain, he engaged another squad of German soldiers, killing the entire squad. Meanwhile, his company officers were watching from an observation post. Suddenly, Germans emerged from the warehouse and moved toward Carter. He opened fire with his submachine gun, bringing down all but two of the Germans. The survivors threw up their hands

and surrendered. While moving his prisoners to the rear, an 88mm shell exploded nearby sending shrapnel into his leg, but the dust thrown up by the shell-burst offered a temporary screen, which allowed him to move back toward the American line. The prisoners provided vital intelligence data to the Americans. Although the Germans destroyed the bridge prior to their withdrawal, the destruction did not stop the American assault (*US News and World Report*, 1999). Carter's heroic actions were instrumental in defeating the enemy's efforts to halt the 12th Armored Division's advance in the Rhineland campaign.

The Army eventually evacuated him to a rear hospital to recover. Within a month, he returned to his unit and remained as a combat soldier through the final weeks of the war.

His efforts won him the Distinguished Service Cross and the Purple Heart. During WWII, Americans looked at those in uniform for their examples of patriotism and selfless dedication. SFC Carter served courageously, helping to liberate tens of millions from Nazi oppression and defending the American people from danger.

The military heritage of African Americans is as long as the history of a black presence in North America. From the first recorded visit of a black person to what is now the United States in 1528, blacks, slave and non-slave, have participated in military actions (Steinberg and Abdul-Jabbar, 1996). History books did not fully acknowledge or give extensive coverage to such participation. Even during the Vietnam War, white Americans were still undecided about black participation in military organizations and in most instances encouraged or allowed blacks in military activities only when forced by circumstances to do so. The image of military organizations within the societies they serve, particularly in democracies, is a cyclical one - positive in times of crisis, negative in times of peace. We all noticed that after the September 11 tragedy, when many Americans started wearing a U.S. Flag emblem on their attire. Whatever the current image, it is appropriate to remember those who contributed or set precedents.

In order to fully appreciate and recognize the significant contributions of SFC Carter, it is important to give a background of the circumstances surrounding military service of an African American soldier during those days. An article on the Center for Military History (CMH) website (<http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/topics/ethnic.htm>) stated that during WWII, over 1.2 million blacks served in one of the four major services. Black participation, however, did not reach the 10 percent quota set in 1940 in any of the services. Most had from 8 to 9 percent blacks in their ranks. Policies on utilization of blacks differed sufficiently in each service so that separate discussions are necessary. The black percentage of total Army strength varied from 5.9 percent at the time of Pearl Harbor to a high 8.7 percent in late 1944 (Steinberg and Abdul-Jabbar, 1996). During WWII, the Army continued its WWI policies on the utilization of blacks and utilized them principally in combat support (Quartermaster and Transportation) units. Overall, blacks constituted 15.5 percent of support units and only 2.8 percent of all combat arms units. At the time, Army leaders argued that the

Army was not a laboratory for social experimentation and limited black participation only to segregated units.

According to CMH, during WWII, the Army reactivated its two WWI African-American divisions; the 92nd and 93rd. “The 92nd Division was eventually committed to the Mediterranean Theater of Operations and suffered over 3,000 casualties in six months of fighting. However, the Army labeled it cowardly because of actions that occurred in late 1944 and early 1945 when certain battalion-size units failed to seize or hold their objectives” (Gibran, 2001). The resulting controversy overlooked the fine service of the rest of the Division, particularly its artillery and support units. The Army eventually awarded over 12,000 decorations and citations to individuals in the 92nd; including two Distinguished Service Crosses, 16 Legion of Merit Awards, 95 Silver Stars, and nearly 1,100 Purple Hearts. Despite the sacrifices and accomplishments, there were blanket generalizations about the poor fighting qualities of black soldiers. The Army unjustifiably applied these accusations to the entire division based on the alleged performance of a few. The second one, the 93rd Division, was assigned to the Pacific but never fought as a whole unit and saw very little combat.

SFC Edward Carter wore his uniform proudly. He exemplified the will to fight for a country that did not give him fair treatment. Despite his injuries at the battle for Speyer, he did not leave the objective until he accomplished the mission. Although his superiors believed that he deserved the Medal of Honor, they believed that, due to his color, his nomination for the award would be denied. They nominated him instead for the Silver Star and he received it. After the war, he helped establish a California National Guard base in Los Angeles, and later served at Fort Lewis, Washington, as a military police officer where his commander described him as an excellent soldier. Despite his glowing records, the Army denied him the opportunity to reenlist and did not provide a reason for this denial. Carter appealed constantly for years, but to no avail. He died in 1963 without the opportunity to defend his good name and preserve his honor.

The Army finally awarded Carter the Medal of Honor in 1997. His daughter-in-law, Allene researched his military records and other files to see why he the Army denied him reenlistment. She used expert skills, circumvented Army bureaucracy, and eventually found that denial of Carter’s reenlistment stemmed from his innocent attendance at a postwar victory dinner hosted by a Communist-affiliated society. Her research cleared SFC Carter of any charges and resulted in a full apology by the President and the Army.

SFC Carter’s courage, sacrifice, and dedication honored and humbled the Army leadership beyond words. To set the record straight, in August 1999, the Army Board for Correction of Military Records met to make a decision regarding the denial of Carter’s reenlistment. It determined that the allegations against him were unfounded and rescinded the bar to reenlistment. Additionally, in November 1999, the Army Vice Chief of Staff, General John M. Keane, hosted a special ceremony at the Pentagon’s Hall of Heroes where he made an apology on behalf of the Army for its banishment of SFC Carter. Finally, in February

2000, the Adjutant General of the California National Guard, General Paul D. Monroe, presented Carter's family with a certificate correcting his National Guard records.

Sergeant Edward A. Carter, Jr. Medal of Honor Citation

"For extraordinary heroism in action on 23 March 1945, near Speyer, Germany. When the tank on which he was riding received heavy bazooka and small arms fire, Sergeant Carter voluntarily attempted to lead a three-man group across an open field. Within a short time, two of his men were killed and the third seriously wounded. Continuing alone, he was wounded five times and finally forced to take cover. As eight enemy riflemen attempted to capture him, Sergeant Carter killed six of them and captured the remaining two. He then crossed the field using as a shield his two prisoners from which he obtained valuable information concerning the disposition of enemy troops. Staff Sergeant Carter's extraordinary heroism was an inspiration to the officers and men of the Seventh Army Infantry Company Number 1 (Provisional) and exemplifies the highest traditions of the Armed Forces."

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ETHICS PAPERS

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SGM Phil Pierce

FA: SGM Nick Spade

R05

15 October 2005

The Army faces many ethical dilemmas in combat. An ethical dilemma exists on the battlefield today with leaders delaying death notification so they can process their soldiers under “Imminent Death.” The Army has regulations that cover “Imminent Death Processing.” This process is for soldiers who will die within 72 hours and will be medically retired. If the medical authority pronounces the soldier dead upon first contact, the soldier’s family will not receive benefits covered under medical retirement. My opinion is that all soldiers killed in combat should be given a medical retirement no matter how the body is found. The Army regulations today do not provide for this.

Leaders at all levels understand that their main duties reside in the welfare of their soldiers and the accomplishment of their mission. Today, the Army embraces families. We give much of our time to building good relations with family readiness groups and supporting outside social activities for soldiers and their families. As a first sergeant or a battalion command sergeant major, you ask your young noncommissioned officers (NCOs) to know their soldiers and families. At leader boards for organizations like the Audie Murphy Club, you ask NCOs about their soldiers and their marital status. You ask how many children they have, their names, and how old they are. We ingrain the idea in today’s leader that the family is important. A young NCO who entered the military 10 years ago did not live in an Army that said, “If the Army wanted you to be married they would have issued you a wife.” Instead, they live in a military where Army leaders want to know the families and what they can do to help. Senior leaders feel the same as their young NCOs. In almost two decades of service I have met many wives, husbands, and children. I can honestly say that I have liked them all. When I deployed a company to combat or to a rotation in the Balkans, I said the same thing I told all of the families of the battalion I deployed to Iraq, “I will do all that I can to take care of your loved one, and at the same time I will do all I can to take care of you.”

The Army has regulations that cover Notification of Death, Casualty and Memorial Affairs (AR 600-8-1), and Retirement Services (AR 600-8-7). We have point papers written by high-level authorities in the military on what the “Imminent Death Processing” program is and what it is not. They say what it is, “a way to get the most coverage for a surviving spouse or child from a service member’s death” Department of Army Staff Judge Advocate (DASJA). They say what it is not, “A way to delay death notification long enough to get the most coverage for a surviving spouse or child from a service member’s death”

(DASJA). The regulations are clear: when you discover a soldier, they must be alive. They must be, “Deemed to expire within 72 hours of the discovery as seen by a competent medical authority” (DAJA-LA). This works with a soldier that has wounds to the chest or abdomen and will certainly bleed out within the next few hours, or a soldier with serious wounds but is holding on for the Medevac aircraft. But what about the soldier shot down in a Chinook and was one of 16 to die that day? Or the soldier killed instantly by a 107mm rocket used as a direct fire weapon? Or even the soldier critically wounded in a raid, and during the confusion of combat the unit was unable to provide the immediate care the traumatized soldier needed? How are we to know that if we would have gotten to a crash site five minutes sooner, recovered from the blast 30 seconds faster, or had one more soldier on the assault team, that these soldiers would have been found alive? Would we have had the time and the forethought to start the necessary action to evaluate him on the battlefield and take better care of his family in the coming years? These thoughts undoubtedly cross the minds of all caring leaders. There are many different types of situations leaders run across on the battlefield and a need to consider the uniqueness of each one. For example, a leader arrives on the scene of his soldier with his battalion surgeon; they both know the fallen soldier. The leader knows the family; he knows the youngest boy that is starting the first grade and the oldest who just began his first year in middle school. The leader, because we as senior leaders have stressed it, knows the wife personally, knows that she is a homemaker struggling with college in an attempt to make a better life for her family when her husband retires. Our leaders today are smart; they look on this soldier and know that all they need to do is prolong the time of death notification by a few hours. Then, the leader starts the paperwork taking care of the soldier’s family for years much better than they would have otherwise.

A leader looks at these situations differently than the officials that wrote the regulations that govern soldiers’ lives. He remembers another soldier wounded in an improvised explosive device (IED) attack. He knows that this individual lived long enough to make it to the hospital in Germany. He had the opportunity to ask for medical retirement before he died to take care of his family. The leader remembers thinking the first soldier was unlucky because an indiscriminate explosion killed him. But, at least he made it out of the country. This next soldier never made it out of the dirt. On the luck scale this soldier gets a zero. Now he is dead and has no voice. The leader and the doctor on the ground are now the collective voices for his wife and children. They agree to go against the Army regulations; their decision will ultimately affect them and their moral obligations to their country, the Army, and its regulations. However, they rationalize their decision, and in the end they make a call that supports two young children, a struggling mother, and a grief-stricken family that lost a husband and father. Sadly, unbeknownst to the family, five months before would be the last time they would ever see him alive.

There is another side of this ethical struggle. This side has the same leader and doctor doing the right thing by the regulations. They will have no problems

with their consciences when it comes to following orders and guidelines put forth by the officers appointed over them. Unfortunately, they will have to face the family on the unit's return. This leader will have to peer into the eyes of the grieving widow. He will look into the eyes of the boys that will never play football in the backyard with their father. When they grow up, they will never know that their mannerisms came from a father only known to them through family pictures of when they were young. Does the leader think he could live with the fact that all he had to do was delay Notification of Death by a few hours? Nothing will bring this soldier back. However, one action-delaying notification could have relieved some of the immense burden from a widowed mother of two.

I believe that dilemmas exist everywhere in today's Army. Some are easy to see and do the right thing by, according to regulations. Others are harder to realize and sometimes appear impossible when faced with the stark reality of combat. Changes to the regulations are required so all soldiers can medically retire if they are killed due to enemy contact. The present regulations put our combat leaders in an unnecessary ethical dilemma. After all, it is the right thing to do for the family of a fallen soldier.

The Army's Ethical Climate Since 11 September 2001

MSG Paul E. Coleman

FA: SGM Osvaldo Vazquez

L04

10 October 2004

Not since the war in Vietnam have our ethics as a nation and as an Army been in question. The terrorist attack in New York on 11 September 2001 created a new ethical and moral dilemma for the Army's leaders and Soldiers. The attack struck at the hearts, and more importantly, the minds of our entire nation, our leaders, and our Soldiers. We are sworn to protect and defend our citizens against all enemies, and yet over 3,000 of our citizens were murdered in the terrorist attack on our country. The first sign that the rules of war, and our ethical and moral obligations as a world leader might be fading could be seen daily on television.

The captured terrorists were drugged, blindfolded and put on planes headed for Cuba. A battalion commander in Iraq fired his pistol near the head of an Iraqi detainee in an attempt to frighten him into divulging information about a planned ambush against U.S. forces. The media documented and televised every detail. I am sure our Soldiers watched and took pride in the battalion commander's actions. He committed this act to save the lives of his fellow Soldiers. Here is a statement from some members of our Congress: "We are highly disturbed by media accounts that the Army is beginning criminal proceedings against Lt. Col. Allen B. West for taking actions in Iraq that he believed were necessary to protect the lives and safety of his men, and which he apparently reported to his chain of command," the congressmen wrote. "To us, such actions if accurately reported do not appear to be those of a criminal." Here is yet another statement from a senator. Sen. James Inhofe, R-Okla., a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said during a 19 November 2004 committee hearing that commander, Lt. Col. Allen West, should be "commended for his actions and interrogation." (www.chron.com/cs/CDA/ssistory.mpl/special/iraq/2274149)

Soldiers are now on display in front of the entire world for their immoral and unethical behavior in the treatment of prisoners of war at Abu Ghraib prison. How did Army leaders and Soldiers get to this point? I believe the war on terror and the war with Iraq greatly contributed to the downturn in our ethical behavior. In the past the United States has always been at the forefront of supporting and enforcing the rules of the Geneva Convention. The Army requires and trains all soldiers to follow the laws and articles contained in the agreement. Here is an excerpt from Article 3 of the Geneva Convention: "1. To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in

any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons: a) Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture... (c) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment.” (<http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/92.htm>)

The President and other national leaders’ decision to treat the terrorist captives differently from other prisoners of war was a turning point in our ethical thinking. The change in rules on the rights of suspected terrorists played a role in the deterioration of our ethical obligations as Soldiers. Some leaders are not properly supervising their Soldiers and want no responsibility for their actions when things go wrong. Soldiers watch as their comrades die every day from a seemingly faceless enemy and feel powerless to do anything to stop it. We cannot continue to allow world events and perceptual bias to define our ethical beliefs and behavior. The seven Army Values must drive our ethical behavior and serve as a guide in the decision making process for all military organizations. Leaders must arm themselves and their Soldiers with the knowledge and tools needed to choose the hard right over the easy wrong in difficult situations. They must develop an understanding of the changing times, values, and attitudes of society. We must talk to our Soldiers on a daily basis about their moral and ethical obligations, instead of depending solely on the rules of engagement to guide them. The Soldier must understand that there are consequences for making unethical decisions whether in combat or peacetime operations. All leaders must be committed to doing the right thing in the most difficult of situations and teaching our young impressionable Soldiers to be equally critical in their thinking.

The leadership of our nation initially took deliberate steps to make sure that another attack did not occur in our nation. We must go back and define exactly what rules and ethics our Soldiers use to govern themselves. War is very stressful and takes on a personal face when we see our own Soldiers and citizens being beheaded on public television. Emotions run away internally and retaliation seems to be our only way to get justice with these killers. Leaders, and Soldiers must recommit to the ethical rules and combine them with Army and personal values in their decision-making process during armed conflicts. Leaders who have gained their Soldiers’ trust, respect, and confidence also inherit the responsibility for their ethical reasoning and behavior.

In summary, Soldiers learn from everything their leaders represent and do, good and bad. The leaders and unfortunately our Soldiers were lulled into looking at ethical behavior through a new and different set of values. The President announced, “we will hunt them down where they live, smoke them out, get them on the run, and punish or kill them.” The leaders and their Soldiers did not receive any additional training or classes to guide them in this new and very unclear message from their Commander in Chief. The treatment and living conditions of the captives seemed to be unimportant, all with the blessing of our President. Our national leaders soon found themselves facing world scrutiny concerning their immoral and inhumane treatment of the captured terrorists. Our leadership’s reply and message to our junior leaders — and

their Soldiers — could not have been clearer: “These savages attacked our nation and anything goes to bring them to justice or death.” We must now earn the respect and trust of the world again if we want to continue to be world leaders and be seen as keepers of humanity.

Laying the Ethical Foundation

SGM Daniel Hagan

FA: SGM Nick Spade

R05

15 October 2004

“Everywhere you look, on the fields of athletic competition, in combat training, operations, and in civilian communities, Soldiers are doing what is right.”
(Former Sergeant Major of the Army Julius W. Gates)

Our experiences have taught us that every Soldier joins the Army with a set of ethical standards and values based on the social and economic environments in which they grew up. As they progress through Basic Training and Advanced Individual Training, we introduce them to the Army Values, the Warrior Ethos, and acceptable standards of conduct that the Army believes are inherent to laying the foundation of sound ethical practices. But is this development process enough to ensure our Soldiers are ethically responsible?

Once a Soldier arrives at their first duty assignment, we should begin to build on these principles and standards during the Team Building Process (Formation, Enrichment, and Sustainment), linked with our ethical responsibilities of being a good role model, developing our Soldiers ethically, and building a sound ethical climate.

Formation Stage	“Role Model”
Enrichment Stage	“Develop Subordinates Ethically”
Sustainment Stage	“Build Ethical Climate”

I believe these stages are critical to the ethical development of Soldiers because if the NCO has done his job and followed all the necessary stages in building his team, then he will have Soldiers who possess and live the Army Values. Armed with the tools of ethical reasoning, they are able to make critical decisions on the battlefield, even in the absence of clear leader guidance or the lack of leader authority.

We all agree that the incidents occurring at Aberdeen Proving Ground and the events at Abu Ghraib prison are prime examples of failures on the part of NCOs and senior leaders to instill in their subordinates a strong sense of ethical responsibility. The breakdown in Army Values, and an absence of NCO leadership, contributed significantly to the lack of not only sound ethical teaching by the Army, but to an ignorance of the very heart of the Noncommissioned Officer Corps core values and the Warrior Ethos. Former SMA Gates observation that “Soldiers are doing what is right” should be the norm, not the exception.

So how do we, as NCOs, foster in our units an atmosphere conducive to sound ethical practices? How do we build upon the foundation of Army Values taught to Soldiers early in their careers? We must first start by looking at ourselves as leaders. It is our responsibility to be “ethical role models” to our Soldiers. Sgt. Maj. Vega’s comments in an NCO Journal article exemplify this point: “Leaders are on display at all times. Soldiers will model them and do as they do. Hopefully all leaders will be honorable men and women who set ethical examples for Soldiers. We cannot simply talk about ethics and ethical behavior. We must set the example in everything we do.”

Second, we must not only teach our Soldiers the Army Values, we must integrate the practice of Army values in our everyday contact with our Soldiers. Whether this is during Sergeants Time Training, in garrison, off-duty, or at any other time, the effect of constant interaction with Soldiers and the development of their ethical and value-laden responsibilities is a definite training multiplier. DO NOT rely on the annual ethics training module to satisfy this requirement. The Warrior Ethos wants us to “live” the Army Values, not just teach them.

Finally, whether you’re a platoon sergeant, first sergeant, or command sergeant major, you are responsible for setting the ethical climate in your unit. Use the Ethical Climate Assessment Survey (ECAS) frequently to measure how you perceive your unit. And remember to be objective, no subjective! Identify any potential problems that may have ethical implications and develop a plan of action to correct or reinforce ethical behavior. Some actions may include modifying your leadership philosophy, changing current unit policies, counseling your junior leaders, and ensuring that rewards and punishments are distributed fairly and equally. The ultimate goal is to possess all the characteristics of a healthy organization that is ethically responsible.

From their initial induction into the Army and throughout their careers, we as leaders have the responsibility to continually develop those ethical standards of behavior in our Soldiers. Through the use of the Team Building Process, the application of our own ethical experiences and responsibilities and recurring assessment, we can embody in not only our Soldiers, but also in our units, strong ethical practices that exemplify and promote the Army Values.

*“I serve the people of the United States and Live the Army Values”
Excerpt from the “Warrior Ethos”*

The Ethics of the United States Television News Media

MSG Keith Preston

FA: SGM Parham

R11

15 September 2004

Does the United States television news media maintain ethical broadcasting behavior? I will explore the process of ethical behavior in the United States television news media. I will prove television news media maintains unethical broadcasting procedures. I will examine multiple facets of the U.S. news networks and how they present the news to the U.S. public.

The television news media in the United States is given the charge of reporting the news impartially and factually. Given the natural state of human nature and how the U.S. public enjoys drama and emotion, this is difficult to impossible at best. The closest the U.S. news media gets to impartial and factual reporting of news stories is through the Associated Press (AP). The reports of the Associated Press are most visible in the global section of newspapers, and occasionally in the television news. The U.S. television news media presents stories with a basis of truth and fact, but rarely with impartiality, opening the door for unethical procedures. The reason behind this is television ratings.

Ratings for television in the United States comprise the entire purpose of television networks. This remains constant for news media as well as networks that show comedy, drama, mystery, or sports. In order for the news media to maintain a popular rating that will keep them from being taken off the air, they must present a popular view to the public. They manage this with personable broadcasters, and carefully designed story schedules. The most popular television news networks include CNN, Fox News, ABC, NBC, and CBS. A testament to their broadcasting popularity is the amount of news networks they own and operate on cable television. An example is CNN, which operates no less than four news networks operating 24 hours a day, seven days a week on cable television. The owners of these networks have a huge impact on the content of the stories shown during a broadcast.

The owners of the television news media in the United States lend their own particular slant on how the media presents news to public. Perhaps the most well known figure is Ted Turner, the owner of CNN news network and many other broadcasting networks. Mr. Turner is well known to be a good friend of Fidel Castro, the Communist leader of Cuba, and constant enemy to the government of the United States. Mr. Turner was also married to the notorious war protestor and actress Jane Fonda. His political leaning has always been solidly to the extreme left. With his multiple news networks broadcasting worldwide, Mr. Turner has tremendous power to alter public opinion through unethical presentation of news stories.

Each U.S. news network presents stories during their broadcasts designed around a long-term agenda. CNN consistently broadcast stories that present the U.S. Republican Party in a bad light. The network has more than ample opportunity to present positive stories for both the Republican and Democratic Parties. The opposite is true of Fox News network. While Fox News claims to be “fair and balanced” with its news broadcasts, the content of their stories lean decisively to the right, or Republican side of news stories. Each news network maintains the ability to broadcast stories that factually and impartially present an accurate and ethical median. They don’t due to the reasons stated above.

The emotional and psychological story that the U.S. news media presents drive their broadcasting. Viewing a half hour news program will take a person through multiple emotions. Generally, a CNN program will begin with a “feel good” story, leading into a more somber piece. With the viewer feeling psychologically depressed, the next story runs into how many people were killed or wounded in the present war, swiftly followed by a negative story about the Republican Party. Normally these stories combine into the financial report, which lowers the hammer on how poorly the Republican administration is handling national affairs and fiscal responsibility. Strangely enough, this doesn’t occur when a Democratic president is in the White House.

Through years of conditioning, the United States public is gradually becoming a slave to the whim of the U.S. news media. With networks like CNN constantly bombarding the U.S. public with negative stories surrounding one political party while glamorizing another party, they can’t possibly present the news in an impartial and factual format. The way they sculpt a broadcast, designed with an emotional and psychological impact on the U.S. public to promote a specific agenda conclusively proves their unethical behavior and degradation of U.S. morale and ethics.

In conclusion, I examined whether the United States television news media maintains ethical broadcasting behavior. I explored the process of ethical behavior in the U.S. television news media. I proved the U.S. television news media maintains unethical news broadcasting procedures due to its system of ratings, owner involvement, broadcasting agenda, the impact of their emotional and psychological stories, and public conditioning.

The Problem with “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”

MSG Tabitha Scrivens

FA: SGM Carpenter

M04

15 October 2004

The question of gays in the military has plagued the Armed Forces since its inception. The topic of homosexuals serving in the military has been fodder for countless ethical debates among both conservatives and liberals in political circles. It is a dilemma that military leaders must face and balance with mission accomplishment. The “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy created one of the most controversial ethical dilemmas in the history of the United States military. At the core of the dilemma is the conflict between society’s changing views on the morality of homosexuality and the strict moral code and traditions observed by the military. Further counterbalancing the homosexual morality issue between society and the military institution are the values of the new generation of men and women who are leading the military. People are a product of the society in which they live, and society has become less sensitive to openly gay individuals. While leaders are tasked to obey all rules and regulations of the military, they are faced with ethical dilemmas when their values clash with the traditions of the military.

A person’s sexual orientation is a morality issue for the military. Instead of being viewed simply as a person’s sexual partner preference, it is viewed as a morality issue that strikes deep into the heart of the military’s core ethics and values. When faced with the issue of gays in the military, the services have yet to balance the question of morality with the importance of competence and filling the ranks with the required number of service members. Ironically, the number of homosexual discharges decrease during times of conflict and war.

The imposition of the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” homosexual conduct policy upon the military provoked a maelstrom of controversy. Constructed to find the happy medium between allowing gays to serve in the military and upholding a strict moral standard, it appeared more like a bandage designed to pacify both gay rights activists and the Pentagon generals. Unfortunately, neither the activists nor the military leaders were pleased with the policy.

Proponents of gays in the military simmer at the thought that gay Americans have to hide their sexual orientation to serve their country. Similarly, opponents of homosexuals serving in the military cringe at the thought of “closet” gays among the ranks. Compounding the problem of the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy are the service members who seem to use the policy to escape the rigors of military life. Exactly how must a leader measure the validity of the claim, “I’m gay, Sir!” when the unit has just received orders for a lengthy deployment? Therein lies another aspect of the ethical dilemma facing

military leaders. Per military regulations, leaders and commanders must act upon any proclamation of homosexuality. However, commanders and their subordinate leaders are faced with the dilemma of whether to ignore the claim and deploy the soldier or to initiate a full inquiry and perhaps lose a service member with invaluable technical and tactical skills.

Prior to the new homosexual conduct policy, leaders had a straight line to follow. If a person was homosexual then he or she had to leave the service. If they were suspected of being homosexual then they were investigated and forced to leave the service if the allegations of homosexuality were substantiated. The “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy was implemented as a pacifier to the clamor in the early 1990s for the military to change its policies and to allow gays to serve openly in the military. The specter of gays serving openly in the military was shelved, albeit temporarily. Military investigations of suspected homosexuals ceased. Operations targeting gays were banned. Commanders and other leaders could no longer question the sexual orientation of their soldiers. Today, leaders constantly find themselves in an unfamiliar “grey” area when dealing with suspected or self-proclaimed homosexuals.

Many view the military’s position on gays in the military as antiquated and behind the times. However, the military has adjusted to the changes in society throughout American history. Oftentimes, the military is one step ahead of society in changing views. Prime examples include the integration of armed forces long before the majority of states enforced the Supreme Court integration rulings as well as the “equal pay for equal work” policy that the military adopted for all its members regardless of gender.

The military could also be a forerunner for accepting gays into its society without the restriction of the current homosexual policy. However, it is not a question of keeping in step with the changing views of society. To the military, it is a question of morality. The resistance to homosexuals serving in the military simply underlines the core values of military society. The values and ethics instilled by the military prohibit sexual relations between people of the same gender. Allowing gays to serve in the military “out of the closet” will never be an acceptable option to the military. However, gays may serve in the military as long as they don’t reveal their sexual orientation or participate in homosexual acts. This forces leaders and the gay service members into an unhealthy situation that could ultimately interfere with the morale of the unit. Leaders may suspect individuals of being gay and even believe that the suspected gay service member causes dissension in the unit and interferes with morale and with the overall good order and discipline of the unit. Conversely, the service member may feel that he or she is being stifled, treated unfairly and unable to truly express himself or herself.

Thought by many to be vague, the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy is actually straightforward and quite clear. The ethical dilemma lies in the enforcement of the policy and obeying the rules of the policy. A striking conflict exists between the accepted moral standard of the military and the changing moral views of society. Enforcement of the policy falls squarely on the shoulders of

the commanders and other leaders. These individuals are a product of both the military teachings and society values. Problems arise from a multitude of situations stemming from the enforcement of the policy. It is naïve for any leader to believe that a person will not engage in a sexual relationship with a person of his or her choosing simply because a policy states that he or she may not engage in such acts.

Leaders may suspect that a person is a homosexual, but little can be done unless credible information is provided to support or justify the suspicion. If a leader suspects a subordinate or a peer of homosexuality, then the peers of the suspected individual may believe that person to be a homosexual, as well. Sadly, this belief may lead to malicious rumors and perverse claims concerning a service member's sexual orientation. It could even lead to acts of violence against suspected homosexuals.

Suddenly, the commanders and all leaders are thrown into a precarious position. The command hasn't the information to initiate an inquiry, but the unit is ripe with rumors concerning homosexuals in their ranks. Immediate training on diversity and the military's homosexual conduct policy may help the situation, but it could also worsen the climate in the unit. Leaders are then faced with an impossible ethical dilemma. What actions are taken when all avenues seem hopeless?

The heart of the ethical dilemma that leaders face is what actions must be taken. They're stymied by the courses of actions that are available to them. If nothing is done in this situation then the climate of the unit will deteriorate. The suspected homosexuals may become targets of harassment or acts of violence if other service members in the organization perceive an intolerance of homosexuals by the command.

The other side of the ethical dilemma is obeying the policy. Homosexuals are serving in the military and it is ridiculous to believe that they are not engaging in sexual relations with partners of their choice. The "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy allows service members to hide their sexual orientation and, in affect, disobey the military's homosexual conduct policy. It also allows leaders the false comfort of believing that there are no homosexuals or "gay issues" in their organizations.

The ethical dilemmas created by the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy resulted in a somewhat uneasy balance between the changing views of society and the strict moral code of the military. It allows homosexuals to serve in the military, but only in the "closet." It prevents leaders from acting on their unsubstantiated suspicions concerning suspected homosexuals, even if it affects the climate in some organizations. Leaders function in a quagmire concerning this issue. They sometimes face the difficult decision of following the policy or doing whatever is necessary to complete their mission and maintaining order and discipline in their units. As long as the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy exists, military leaders will face ethical dilemmas concerning homosexuals in the military.

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